Alabama Supreme Court Reverses Overly-Broad Injunction Prohibiting Competition Among Defense Contractors

Earlier this year, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed a preliminary injunction entered by the trial court in a case involving competing defense contractors at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville. See Monte Sano Research Corp. v. Kratos Defense & Securities Solutions, Inc., — So. 3d —, 2012 WL 1890693 (Ala. May 25, 2012).  The underlying litigation remains on-going, but the Alabama Supreme Court’s ruling can provide insight for those involved in non-compete litigation in Alabama courts or in non-compete disputes involving government contracts.

By way of background to Monte Sano, the U.S. government awards certain defense contracts (in this case, “Army Aviation and Missile Command Express” contracts) via multi-year “blanket purchase agreements” awarded to “prime contractors” in four different “domains”:  (i) logistics, (ii) programmatic, (iii) technical, and (iv) business and analytical.  In 2005, the Army awarded one such blanket purchase agreement in the technical domain to Computer Science Corporation (“CSC”), who thus became a prime contractor for certain work to be performed at the Redstone Arsenal.  One of the plaintiffs in Monte Sano, Kratos Defense & Securities Solutions, Inc. (“Kratos”), via a predecessor corporation, was part of CSC’s team (i.e., a potential sub-contractor) in obtaining this blanket purchase agreement for the technical domain.  However, simply being a member of the team does not guarantee that individual tasks will be awarded to a particular sub-contractor; additional bidding is involved at the task level.

In Monte Sano, two of the defendants, Steven Thornton and Steven Teague, previously worked for Plaintiff Kratos.  Thornton and Teague both left employment with Kratos in 2011 to work for defendant Monte Sano Research Corp. (“MSRC”).  MSRC was formed in 2009 and was allegedly partially owned by Teague (but not Thornton) at the time of its formation.  Prior to the departure of Thornton and Teague, CSC had entered into various sub-contracts with both Kratos and MSRC to perform work for a “task” under its “blanket purchase agreement” for the “technical” domain at the Redstone Arsenal.   Upon the departure of Thornton and Teague, Kratos immediately filed suit against MSRC, Thornton, and Teague, and obtained from the trial court a preliminary injunction prohibiting MSRC, Thornton, and Teague from procuring work from any “prime contractor” at the Redstone Arsenal.

Notably, although Thornton and Teague had previously entered into non-competition agreements with Kratos, these agreements were of limited duration and expired at the end of 2010.  As such, there were no explicit non-competition agreements in force when Thornton and Teague left Kratos’s employment.  There were, however, more generalized provisions in Kratos’s employee handbook regarding the duty to maintain confidential information and not to solicit Kratos’s employees or otherwise encourage employees to leave Kratos’s employment.  The handbook provisions regarding the duty to maintain confidential information had no time limit, and the duty not to encourage other Kratos employees to leave purported to last one-year beyond the end of employment.  Moreover, in Monte Sano, Kratos alleged that Teague had arranged lunches in which Kratos employees were informed of new opportunities with MSRC.  In bringing claims against Thornton and Teague, Kratos alleged that they had (i) breached their duties of loyalty and their fiduciary duties; (ii) tortiously interfered with Kratos’s contractual relations with the “prime contractor” CSC; and (iii) breached their contractual obligations as set out in Kratos’s employee handbook and elsewhere.  Kratos also brought tortious interference claims against MSRC.

The Alabama Supreme Court, however, reversed the preliminary injunction, noting that the injunction was overly broad because it prohibited MSRC from performing work for any prime contractor at the Redstone Arsenal, in any domain, and not just the technical domain implicated by Kratos’s contract with CSC.  (The evidence in this case showed that MSRC had also been negotiating with prime contractors, other than CSC, in other domains.)  The Alabama Supreme Court also noted that the trial court’s injunction order did not comply with Rule 65(d)(2) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure because it did not provide specific reasons for its decision and did not address why Kratos did not have an adequate remedy at law.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Murdock noted that, because the preliminary injunction would have prevented MSRC from performing its sub-contract with CSC, CSC should also have been named as a party to the litigation.

As to “take aways” from the Monte Sano decision, the Alabama Supreme Court’s holding demonstrates the importance of having written non-competition agreements, such that employers faced with departing employees are not forced to rely on more generalized duties of loyalty and more generalized handbook provisions.  Monte Sano also emphasizes the risks of bringing “tortious interference” claims against a competitor who hires away employees when such claims are not supported by non-competition agreements with specific employees.

This said, the fact that the Monte Sano litigation made it as far it did (and is still on-going) shows that employers without explicit non-competition agreements are not without hope.  Had the preliminary injunction in Monte Sano been limited to the technical domain work covered by Kratos’s contracts with CSC, the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision might have been different, even in the absence of a non-competition agreement.  Thus, perhaps the biggest take away from Monte Sano is that it helps to be specific (and not over-reach), whether in drafting a non-competition agreement at the outset of employment or in seeking relief from a court after a competitor has hired away a key employee. For more clarification on the topic of non-compete agreements and clauses, please contact one of the Burr & Forman team members for assistance.

Former Events Coordinator Challenges Non-Compete Agreement

A former employee of Event Logistics, Inc. recently filed suit in the Davidson County Chancery Court challenging her employer’s non-compete agreement signed two years after her employment began.  In Veit v. Event Logistics, Inc., Davidson County Chancery Court Docket No. 12-945-III, Falon Marie Veit (“Veit”) alleges her employer, Event Logistics, Inc. (“ELI”), asked her to sign a “Non-Competition, Non-Solicitation, and Confidentiality Agreement” (the “Agreement”) on November 28, 2007 after she was promoted to a vice president position.  After completing a high profile event for the 2012 Iroquois Steeplechase, Veit resigned her employment with ELI on May 15, 2012.

The Agreement prohibits Veit for a period of two years from (1) engaging in activities competing with ELI within a 50 mile radius of ELI’s office in Nashville; (2) soliciting ELI’s customers with whom Veit had contact while employed by ELI; and (3) soliciting any of ELI’s employees to terminate his/her employment with ELI.

In her Complaint, Veit asks the Court to determine that the Agreement is not enforceable and that she is free to resume her activities as an events coordinator with clients with whom she worked while employed by ELI.  Veit argues ELI is not at risk of unfair competition because (1) event planning does not involve technical skills learned through specialized training provided by ELI; and (2) potential consumers of event planning services are not confidential or proprietary to ELI, but are individuals and commercial businesses that may need such services at any time and any location.

Veit also argues there is no adequate consideration supporting the Agreement.  Veit alleges she signed the Agreement because she was promised she would become an owner of ELI.  She ended her relation with ELI when it became apparent ELI would not give her an ownership interest in the company.

The Court recently denied Veit’s Motion for a temporary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Agreement.  The Court found there were significant disputes as to whether ELI invested in Veit’s training, whether Veit had access to confidential and proprietary information, and whether Veit had developed into the “face of the company” with respect to ELI’s customers.  However, the Court temporarily modified the Agreement to allow Veit to engage in certain limited event coordinating activities so she could make a living.

This will be an interesting case to watch. Veit’s challenge to ELI’s non-compete agreement goes to the heart of balancing between the desire for free trade and prohibiting a former employee from unfairly competing against her employer.  It also demonstrates the Court’s authority to modify or “blue pencil” a non-compete agreement to achieve this balance.

Watch for updates on Veit v. Events Logistics, Inc. in the near future.

The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine — A Glimmer of Hope in the Absence of a Non-Compete Agreement

In the hilarious movie Dumb and Dumber, the imbecilic and unattractive character played by Jim Carrey is told by the beautiful woman he is pursuing that the chances of them winding up together are about one in a million, to which he excitedly replies, “So you’re telling me there’s a chance!” Similarly, if an employer wants to enjoin a former employee from working for a competitor, but the employee is not under any sort of non-compete agreement with the former employer, has taken no company records and property, and has not revealed any confidential information or trade secrets to the new employer, the inevitable disclosure doctrine of trade secrets law provides the employer with at least a “chance” of getting the desired injunction.

The inevitable disclosure doctrine is used by employers to stop former employees from working for competitors, even in the absence of a non-compete agreement, on the basis that it is inevitable that the employee will use or disclose the former employer’s trade secrets in connection with the new employment. The significance of this theory is that the employer is not required to prove an actual misappropriation of a trade secret, but rather that the disclosure of the trade secret is inevitable based on the nature of the information and the circumstances of the employee’s new position.

As with all trade secret issues, the law on inevitable disclosure varies somewhat from state to state. For instance, California courts have rejected the doctrine as creating a “de facto covenant not to compete”, Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 1999), and held that the doctrine “cannot be used as a substitute for proving actual or threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.”  Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 294 (4th Dist. 2002). The Third Circuit Federal Court of Appeals, however, applied a relatively lenient standard under Pennsylvania law for successfully using the theory, holding that an employer need only show a “substantial likelihood” of disclosure of a trade secret. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102,110 (3d Cir. 2010). (For an excellent nationwide survey of the doctrine, see Ryan A. Wiesner, A State-by-State Analysis of Inevitable Disclosure: A Need for Uniformity and a Workable Standard, 16 Intellectual Property L. Rev. 211 (2012)).

The Georgia Supreme Court has recognized the inevitable disclosure doctrine, although not referring to it by name, in the case of Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Corp., 269 Ga. 553, 501 S.E. 2d 501 (1998). In that opinion, the court upheld the trial court’s injunction prohibiting Southwire’s former employee from working for Southwire’s direct competitor’s logistics department for a period of five years. As the basis for its ruling, the court concluded that the competitor had “sought to obtain, by the simple act of hiring [Southwire's former employee], all the logistics information it had taken Southwire millions of dollars and years of testing and modifications to develop as part of Southwire’s plan to acquire a competitive edge over other cable and wire companies ….” Id. at 557. There was neither mention in the opinion of the employee having a non-compete agreement nor any mention of an actual misappropriation by the employee of the alleged trade secret. Instead, the implication of the decision was that disclosure of Southwire’s logistics system was inevitable because of the identity of Southwire and its competitor’s business.

BURR POINT: Even in the absence of an enforceable non-compete agreement, the inevitable disclosure doctrine provides a means for enjoining a former employee’s competitive activities in certain circumstances. For more information on the inevitable disclosure doctrine or how it might apply to your business, don’t hesitate to contact one of the Burr & Forman team members.

Eleventh Circuit Confirms Georgia Legislature Wisely Did a “Do Over” on the New Non-Compete Statute

In golf, a hacker who slices his tee shot into the woods will often announce that he’s going to take a “mulligan”, i.e., hit another ball as if the first one never happened. Georgia’s General Assembly took a legislative mulligan in re-enacting its new non-compete statute, and a recent Eleventh Circuit opinion, Becham v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11225 (11th Cir. 2012), should make the folks under the Gold Dome glad they did.

In 2009, the Georgia General Assembly passed HB 173, which was a bill designed to make non-compete agreements and other post-employment restrictive covenants much easier for employers to enforce. The effectiveness of HB 173 was dependent upon a positive ratification by Georgia voters of a state constitutional amendment authorizing the new law. In November 2010, Georgia voters passed the amendment by a 2-1 margin. Because HB 173 specifically stated that it would become effective the day after ratification of the amendment, legislators, lawyers and employers all assumed that Georgia finally had its new employer-friendly non-compete statute in place as of November 3, 2010.

Shortly after the ratification of the amendment, however, some non-compete attorneys and commentators, including this author, began to have serious concerns about the effectiveness of the new law due to a discrepancy between the effective date of the new law, November 3, 2010, and the effective date of the constitutional amendment, which by law was January 1, 2011 (because the amendment, due to a legislative oversight, did not have a specified effective date).  The analysis was that because the new statute was not constitutionally authorized on the date it became effective, it was unconstitutional and could not be revived by the later effectiveness of the amendment. This author shared the concerns of practitioners with the sponsor of HB 173, Rep. Wendell Willard, and he eventually concluded that the statute needed to be re-passed in the next session in an abundance of caution. (Go here for a discussion between the author and Rep. Willard about the events leading up to re-passage of the bill).

Thus, in 2011, the General Assembly passed a new bill, HB 30 (codified at OCGA §13-8-50 et seq.), that was essentially identical to the 2009 bill. This new statute, however, by its terms only applied to agreements executed on or after the new effective date of May 11, 2011. This left some uncertainty about how Courts would treat non-compete agreements executed during the legislative twilight zone period between the effective dates of the first and second versions of the new non-compete statute. Would courts give any deference to employers who had their employees execute new non-competes in reliance upon the much ballyhooed passage of the new statute?

That question was answered in the negative by the Eleventh Circuit in the recent Becham opinion. In that case, an employer was attempting to enforce a non-compete agreement dated December 1, 2010, after the ratification of the constitutional amendment and the effective date of HB 173, but before the effective date of the corrective 2011 statute. In affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employee-defendant, the Eleventh Circuit held that “HB 173 was unconstitutional and void the moment it went into effect”, thus confirming the analysis of the practitioners who first reached out to the bill sponsor. The effect of that ruling was that the Court applied the much more onerous pre-statute body of Georgia non-compete law, and the plaintiff’s non-compete covenants were held to be unenforceable

BURR POINT:  The Georgia lawmakers’ nimble legislative repair of its previous misstep on the timing of the new non-compete statute means that all’s well that ends well, unless you’re an employer caught in the gap of the effective dates of the two versions of the law.  For Georgia employers, it is now clear that your non-competes must be executed on or after May 11, 2011, in order to take advantage of the more lenient new statute. For more information or help further understanding the changes to Georgia’s non-compete laws, contact a member of Burr & Forman’s Non-Compete and Trade Secrets team.

New Hampshire Enacts Non-Compete and Non-Piracy Legislation Effective July 14, 2012

New Hampshire has joined the ranks of numerous other states with non-compete statutes. On July 14, 2012, New Hampshire’s non-compete and non-piracy law became effective and aims to ensure that advance notice will be provided to employees who will be required to sign a non-compete or non-piracy agreement as a condition of their employment or change in job position:

Prior to or concurrent with making an offer of change in job classification or an offer of employment, every employer shall provide a copy of any non-compete or non-piracy agreement that is part of an employment agreement to the employee or potential employee.  Any contract that is not in compliance with this section shall be void and unenforceable.

Under the new law, an employer is prohibited from sandbagging a new employee by presenting him/her with a non-compete or non-piracy agreement on his/her first day of work after he/she has already accepted the offer, particularly in situations where the employee has quit a job to begin work with the new employer only to learn of the “surprise” agreement at that time.  Now, not only must the employee be informed that a non-compete or non-piracy agreement will be a term of his/her employment should he/she accept an offer, but also the employee must be provided with a copy of the actual agreement itself.  The employee then has an opportunity to review and consider the agreement and the impact thereof, and decide whether to accept the offer and the agreement and if employed, quit his/her current job.  This same analysis applies in the case of an employee who is offered an internal job change (e.g., lateral move, promotion, etc.) which will require him/her to sign a non-compete or non-piracy agreement.

New Hampshire courts will continue to handle “traditional” disputes as to the reasonableness of the geographic scope and duration of non-compete agreements and whether the employer has a legitimate protectable interest.  But, after July 14, those same courts will undoubtedly be asked to decide and handle a variety of debacles arising as a result of the new law and the questions it leaves unanswered, such as whether non-solicitation, non-recruitment, and/or nondisclosure agreements constitute “non-piracy” agreements.  That said, as the penalty for noncompliance with the new law is steep – i.e., invalidation of the entire agreement – employers would be wise to act conservatively and avoid any missteps by ensuring reasonable advance notice is provided, written acknowledgment of the notice is given by the employee, and non-solicitation, non-recruitment, and non-disclosure agreements are treated as non-piracy agreements subject to the new law.