Alabama’s New Non-Compete Statute: Are You Ready For New Year’s Day?

Those involved in drafting, negotiating, or litigating covenants-not-to-compete in Alabama have long known that Alabama’s statute books seldom provide ready answers on this particular topic.  The text of current Alabama Code § 8-1-1, entitled “Contracts restraining business void; exceptions,” was — until this year — last amended in 1940.  This text consists of three short paragraphs and does not delve into details nba predictions.  As a practical matter, this has meant that, for the past 75 years, it has been up to Alabama courts to fill in the details.

This is about to change.  On June 11, 2015, Governor Bentley signed into law House Bill No. 352, entitled “Contracts, use of restrictive covenants clarified, Sec. 8-1-1 repealed.”  The new law comes into effect on January 1, 2016 and repeals all of current Alabama Code § 8-1-1.

At least in some respects, the provisions of the new law mirror what Alabama courts have already been doing.  This codification of previous court outcomes into Alabama’s statute books should help to provide clarity when drafting, negotiating, and litigating future agreements.  In other respects, though, the new statute innovates.  As a result, employers will want to pay close attention to the new law and make sure that their existing agreements comply with the law.

The old and new laws both begin by stating the general rule that contracts restraining anyone in the exercise of a lawful profession, trade, or business are void.  However, the new law now enumerates, in detail, the exceptions to this general rule of voidness.

Section 1(b) of the new law lists, as exceptions, six categories of contracts that “are allowed to preserve a protectable interest.”  Of interest to employers, sub-items 1(b)(4) and 1(b)(5) include, within these exceptions, non-competition and non-solicitation agreements entered into between a “commercial entity” and an employee of that entity basketball predictions today.  In other words, non-competition and non-solicitation agreements entered into as part of the employment relationship might be valid under Alabama law, but only if the agreements “preserve a protectable interest.”

Section 2(a) of the new law defines “protectable interests” so as to include not just “trade secrets,” but also “pricing information and methodology,” “customer lists,” “business models and data,” and “contacts with specific prospective or existing customers,” among others.  However, Section 2(b) says:  “Job skills in and of themselves, without more, are not protectable interests.”  As a result, employers seeking to enforce a non-competition or non-solicitation agreement will need to pay close attention to the list of “protectable interests” in Section 2(a).

For prohibitions on competition after the end of employment, the new law states that a restrictive covenant of “two years or less” in duration will be presumed reasonable.  This two-year period is, on the whole, consistent with Alabama court decisions over the past 75 years.  However, the new law then provides a shorter “presumptively reasonably” time-period (usually 18 months after the end of employment) for agreements prohibiting the solicitation of the employer’s customers.  These differing presumptions for non-competition and non-solicitation agreements are one of many reasons why Alabama employers may wish to review their non-competition and non-solicitation agreements for compliance with the new law.

New Year’s Day 2016 and Alabama’s new law are coming soon.  If you are an employer and have questions about how Alabama’s new law might impact a specific agreement your business uses, please feel free to contact a member of Burr & Forman’s “Non-Compete and Trade Secrets” team for additional information.

Is A Licensed Securities Dealer A “Professional” Under Alabama Law Prohibiting Enforcement of Nonsolicitation Agreements Against Professionals?

The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals released a slip opinion on May 16, 2014 addressing enforcement of a nonsolicitation agreement against a licensed securities broker.  See G.L.S. & Associates, Inc., and G.L. Smith & Associates, Inc. v. Keith Rogers, No. 2130322 (Ala. Civ. App. May 16, 2014) (Slip Opinion).  The defendant (Rogers) worked for a securities firm (GLSA) and had an employment agreement that contained a nonsolicitation provision which prohibited Rogers from soliciting GLSA’s clients for a period of two years after termination of employment.  Rogers resigned from his employment in January 2013.  Thereafter, GLSA filed a complaint against Rogers, attaching the employment agreement to the complaint basketball score predictions, and arguing that Rogers had solicited GLSA’s clients in violation of the agreement.

At the trial court level, Rogers moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, averring that he was a “professional” and therefore the nonsolicitation provisions were unenforceable under Alabama law, in particular, Section 8-1-1 of the Alabama Code and the factors for determining whether an occupation is a “profession” as set out by the Alabama Supreme Court in Friddle v. Raymond, 575 So. 2d 1038, 1039 (Ala. 1991) (factors are “professional training, skill, and experience required to perform certain services;  delicate nature of the services offered; and the ability and need to make instantaneous decisions”) (citing Odess v. Taylor, 211 So. 2d 805 (Ala. 1968)).

To read the rest of this article and others on securities litigation, please visit the Burr & Forman Securities Litigation & Arbitration blog.

Is An Assigned Non-Compete Agreement Enforceable?

In the case of a merger or acquisition, the successor company might take an assignment of the current non-compete agreements in favor of the predecessor company.  The enforceability of an assigned non-compete agreement, however, varies from state-to-state, as is true with most issues concerning non-compete law.  Below is a quick survey of how some of the states in the Southeast address the issue:

Georgia – Non-compete agreements, similar to most contracts in the state, are assignable provided that the duties under the agreement do not materially vary from the performance required by the original parties and provided that the contract is not for personal services.  West Coast Cambridge, Inc. v. Rice, 262 Ga. App. 106 (2003) (finding that successor partnership could enforce noncompete agreement against doctor because the law provided no prohibition against the assignment of the agreement and the agreement was expressly binding on successors and assigns, and noting that contract was not for personal services because it only obligated the doctor to not take certain actions).

Tennessee – Tennessee law recognizes that covenants not to compete are assignable absent specific language in the covenants prohibiting assignment.  See Packers Supply Co. v. Weber, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2008) (citing Bradford & Carson v. Montgomery Furniture Co., 115 Tenn. 610, 92 S.W. 1104 (Tenn. 1906)).

Alabama – Because non-compete agreements are disfavored as a restraint on trade (see Ala. Code § 8-1-1), a successor employer cannot enforce an employee’s covenant not to compete.  Construction Materials v. Kirkpatrick Concrete, 631 So. 2d 1006 (Ala. 1994) (refusing to enforce noncompete agreement for successor of employer and noting that the legislature’s omission of a specific provision in Ala. Code § 8-1-1 establishing a successor employer’s right to enforce an employee’s covenant with the predecessor employer creates an affirmative interference that this code section was not intended to allow enforcement by successor employers).

Florida – In Florida, the question is answered specifically by  Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(f)(2), which provides that a “court shall not refuse enforcement of a restrictive covenant on the ground that the person seeking enforcement is . . . an assignee or successor” provided that “the restrictive covenant expressly authorized enforcement by a party’s assignee or successor.”  Recently, Florida’s First District Court of Appeal held that a general assignment clause (such as a statement that the agreement will “inure to the benefit of and be binding upon . . . assigns and successor) is sufficient to assign the agreement to a successor.  DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Waxman, 95 So. 3d 928 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2012).

BURR POINT:  Special attention should be paid when drafting a non-compete covenant to ensure that the assignability of the covenant is in accordance with the parties’ expectations and the applicable state law.


If you would like additional information on non-compete agreements and trade secrets law, please contact one of the Burr & Forman Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members.

Does the Alabama Trade Secrets Act Limit Remedies for Theft of Information?

Alabama enacted the Alabama Trade Secrets Act (the “ATSA”) in 1987.  However, since that time, there have been relatively few reported court decisions analyzing the impact of the ATSA on common law claims.  A federal district court in Alabama recently grappled with these issues.  Relying on interpretations of other states’ laws based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Judge Blackburn read the ATSA’s preemption provision broadly, holding that the ATSA preempted any common law claims based on “the same underlying facts.”  Madison Oslin, Inc. v. Interstate Resources, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142082 (N.D. Ala., Sept. 30, 2012).

In Madison Oslin, the plaintiff was an Alabama-based paper-coating company who had developed a novel process for using polyester instead of wax to coat corrugated cardboard.  Whereas traditional wax-coated cardboard cannot be recycled, the new polyester-coated cardboard would be fully recyclable, saving landfill costs.

This Alabama paper-coating company was approached by a cardboard-box manufacturer with facilities in Maryland, and the two companies proposed forming a joint venture to manufacture polyester-coated corrugated cardboard boxes.  Under the proposed joint venture agreement, the box manufacturer would pay the paper-coating company an initial lump-sum fee of $6 million, and thereafter, the two would evenly split profits from the sale of recyclable boxes through the joint venture.

However, after the cardboard-box manufacturer signed a confidentiality agreement and had been allowed to observe the polyester-coating process during tours of the paper-coating company’s facilities in Alabama, the cardboard-box manufacturer allegedly began advertising (and manufacturing) a “recyclable corrugated box.”  The proposed joint venture agreement apparently remained unsigned, and the box manufacturer did not compensate the paper-coating company for use of its proprietary processes.  The paper-coating company, as plaintiff, then brought a multiple-count complaint against several defendants, including the cardboard-box manufacturer and its subsidiary in Maryland that operated the box-manufacturing facility.   The counts included a cause of action under the ATSA, as well as common law claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and suppression, among others.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s common law claims, arguing that these claims were subsumed by the ATSA claim, and also moved to have the action transferred to Maryland.  In evaluating the motion to dismiss, Judge Blackburn noted that there was very little Alabama case law on point.  Thus, the court analyzed the comments to the ATSA and to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and also examined other courts’ analyses of this issue under trade secrets statutes enacted in Georgia.  As noted in one of the Georgia cases, statutes protecting trade secrets are intended to encourage the free flow of information.  Under this analysis, claims involving “theft of information” should be limited to cases in which the information can be shown to be a trade secret; allowing claims for the theft of “non-proprietary” information or for the theft of “unguarded” proprietary information could arguably discourage this free flow of information.  Finding this reasoning persuasive, Judge Blackburn in Madison Oslin determined that the ATSA preempted any common law causes of action arising from the same factual allegations as ATSA claims and thus dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and suppression.  The plaintiff was, however, allowed to proceed with its breach-of-contract claims, as well as its ATSA claims.  Because Judge Blackburn also granted the defendants’ request for a transfer, these remaining claims are now being litigated in Maryland.

A “take away” from the Madison Oslin decision is that an Alabama employer faced with the theft of information may want to begin its analysis of potential legal remedies by looking at the ATSA.

If you would like additional information on non-compete agreements and trade secrets law, please contact one of the Burr & Forman Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members.

Litigation Risks From Job Applicants With Non-Compete Agreements

When a job applicant discloses a non-compete agreement with a former employer, the prospective employer may already be aware that, if the applicant is hired, the former employer might sue for “tortious interference.”  However, as two recent decisions by federal courts in Alabama make clear, a prospective employer can also face claims brought by job applicants — especially if a job offer is rescinded or if the proposed employment does not go as planned.

In Jones v. Océ Imagistics, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-163-CG-M, 2012 WL 6014612 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 3, 2012), an employer (Océ Imagistics) allegedly hired an employee (Mr. Jones) knowing that he had a non-compete agreement with a former employer.  Océ Imagistics later terminated Mr. Jones’s employment when the former employer threatened to sue.  Following his termination, Mr. Jones sued Océ Imagistics.

Similarly, in Cochran v. Five Points Temporaries, LLC, — F. Supp.2d —, 2012 WL 5492597 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2012), an employer (Five Points) hired an employee (Ms. Cochran) who had a non-compete agreement with a former employer.  However, when the former employer filed suit, Five Points did not initially terminate Ms. Cochran’s employment, but instead hired attorneys to defend her.  Notwithstanding, when Five Points stopped paying for the attorneys, Ms. Cochran turned around and sued Five Points.

The employees in Jones and Cochran attempted to bring “misrepresentation” claims based on almost identical statements by the employers.  When Mr. Jones first told his new employer about his non-compete, the new employer allegedly told him that the “Legal Department says that the non-compete agreement is not enforceable.”  Likewise, when Ms. Cochran told her new employer about her non-compete, the new employer allegedly told her that the attorneys said the non-compete agreement was “not worth the paper on which it was written.”  Both courts, however, rejected such “misrepresentation” claims.  Under Alabama law, stating that a non-compete agreement is “not enforceable” does not necessarily misrepresent anything — this is a statement of opinion, not fact.

Unlike the Jones case, though, the Cochran case did not dismiss the employee’s claims in their entirety.  Ms. Cochran also claimed breach of contract, pointing to a document in which her employer had allegedly agreed to pay for her attorneys.  The court found the allegations in Ms. Cochran’s complaint sufficient to state a claim for breach of this alleged contract.

However, Ms. Cochran’s attorneys not only defended her from her former employer’s claims for breach of the non-compete agreement; her attorneys also filed counterclaims on her behalf.  According to the filings in the state court action initiated by the former employer, the countersuit included allegations that the former employer’s president had “grabbed Cochran’s right buttock” at a company Christmas party.  Her new employer did not believe there was any obligation to fund such a countersuit.  Although the litigation between the former employer and Ms. Cochran has since been resolved, her claims against the new employer (Five Points) are still being litigated.  Meanwhile, the relationship was further soured when Five Points subsequently terminated Ms. Cochran’s employment.

As Jones and Cochran both illustrate, too much focus on a non-compete agreement can lead to litigation exposure in other areas.  In Jones, the employer terminated the new hire (so as to avoid non-compete litigation with the former employer) and was sued by the new hire.  In Cochran, the new employer initially stuck by the new hire through funding litigation over alleged misdeeds at the former employer’s Christmas party.  However, the employer in Cochran was sued by the new hire, too.  Employers considering job applicants who have non-compete agreements should keep in mind general employment-law principles and evaluate the risk of claims by job applicants and new hires, as well as the risk of claims by former employers.

Alabama Supreme Court Reverses Overly-Broad Injunction Prohibiting Competition Among Defense Contractors

Earlier this year, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed a preliminary injunction entered by the trial court in a case involving competing defense contractors at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville. See Monte Sano Research Corp. v. Kratos Defense & Securities Solutions, Inc., — So. 3d —, 2012 WL 1890693 (Ala. May 25, 2012).  The underlying litigation remains on-going, but the Alabama Supreme Court’s ruling can provide insight for those involved in non-compete litigation in Alabama courts or in non-compete disputes involving government contracts.

By way of background to Monte Sano, the U.S. government awards certain defense contracts (in this case, “Army Aviation and Missile Command Express” contracts) via multi-year “blanket purchase agreements” awarded to “prime contractors” in four different “domains”:  (i) logistics, (ii) programmatic, (iii) technical, and (iv) business and analytical.  In 2005, the Army awarded one such blanket purchase agreement in the technical domain to Computer Science Corporation (“CSC”), who thus became a prime contractor for certain work to be performed at the Redstone Arsenal.  One of the plaintiffs in Monte Sano, Kratos Defense & Securities Solutions, Inc. (“Kratos”), via a predecessor corporation, was part of CSC’s team (i.e., a potential sub-contractor) in obtaining this blanket purchase agreement for the technical domain.  However, simply being a member of the team does not guarantee that individual tasks will be awarded to a particular sub-contractor; additional bidding is involved at the task level.

In Monte Sano, two of the defendants, Steven Thornton and Steven Teague, previously worked for Plaintiff Kratos.  Thornton and Teague both left employment with Kratos in 2011 to work for defendant Monte Sano Research Corp. (“MSRC”).  MSRC was formed in 2009 and was allegedly partially owned by Teague (but not Thornton) at the time of its formation.  Prior to the departure of Thornton and Teague, CSC had entered into various sub-contracts with both Kratos and MSRC to perform work for a “task” under its “blanket purchase agreement” for the “technical” domain at the Redstone Arsenal.   Upon the departure of Thornton and Teague, Kratos immediately filed suit against MSRC, Thornton, and Teague, and obtained from the trial court a preliminary injunction prohibiting MSRC, Thornton, and Teague from procuring work from any “prime contractor” at the Redstone Arsenal.

Notably, although Thornton and Teague had previously entered into non-competition agreements with Kratos, these agreements were of limited duration and expired at the end of 2010.  As such, there were no explicit non-competition agreements in force when Thornton and Teague left Kratos’s employment.  There were, however, more generalized provisions in Kratos’s employee handbook regarding the duty to maintain confidential information and not to solicit Kratos’s employees or otherwise encourage employees to leave Kratos’s employment.  The handbook provisions regarding the duty to maintain confidential information had no time limit, and the duty not to encourage other Kratos employees to leave purported to last one-year beyond the end of employment.  Moreover, in Monte Sano, Kratos alleged that Teague had arranged lunches in which Kratos employees were informed of new opportunities with MSRC.  In bringing claims against Thornton and Teague, Kratos alleged that they had (i) breached their duties of loyalty and their fiduciary duties; (ii) tortiously interfered with Kratos’s contractual relations with the “prime contractor” CSC; and (iii) breached their contractual obligations as set out in Kratos’s employee handbook and elsewhere.  Kratos also brought tortious interference claims against MSRC.

The Alabama Supreme Court, however, reversed the preliminary injunction, noting that the injunction was overly broad because it prohibited MSRC from performing work for any prime contractor at the Redstone Arsenal, in any domain, and not just the technical domain implicated by Kratos’s contract with CSC.  (The evidence in this case showed that MSRC had also been negotiating with prime contractors, other than CSC, in other domains.)  The Alabama Supreme Court also noted that the trial court’s injunction order did not comply with Rule 65(d)(2) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure because it did not provide specific reasons for its decision and did not address why Kratos did not have an adequate remedy at law.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Murdock noted that, because the preliminary injunction would have prevented MSRC from performing its sub-contract with CSC, CSC should also have been named as a party to the litigation.

As to “take aways” from the Monte Sano decision, the Alabama Supreme Court’s holding demonstrates the importance of having written non-competition agreements, such that employers faced with departing employees are not forced to rely on more generalized duties of loyalty and more generalized handbook provisions.  Monte Sano also emphasizes the risks of bringing “tortious interference” claims against a competitor who hires away employees when such claims are not supported by non-competition agreements with specific employees.

This said, the fact that the Monte Sano litigation made it as far it did (and is still on-going) shows that employers without explicit non-competition agreements are not without hope.  Had the preliminary injunction in Monte Sano been limited to the technical domain work covered by Kratos’s contracts with CSC, the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision might have been different, even in the absence of a non-competition agreement.  Thus, perhaps the biggest take away from Monte Sano is that it helps to be specific (and not over-reach), whether in drafting a non-competition agreement at the outset of employment or in seeking relief from a court after a competitor has hired away a key employee. For more clarification on the topic of non-compete agreements and clauses, please contact one of the Burr & Forman team members for assistance.