Although non-compete and trade secret litigators by definition make our living from disputes involving unfair competition, often the most useful part of our practice involves advising clients on how to avoid litigation. John Marsh of Hahn Loeser has compiled an excellent list for employers and their new hires, of things not to do when the employee leaves the old job, titled The Trade Secret Litigator’s 7 Deadly Sins of Departing Employees in Trade Secret and Non-Compete Disputes. This should be required reading for any transitioning employee; if universally followed, it could put trade secret lawyers out of business!
Two Recent High-Stakes Trade Secrets Decisions Demonstrate Broad Protection and Potential for Large Exposure
When a party breaches a confidentiality agreement, claims for misappropriation of trade secrets and breach of the confidentiality agreement are often asserted simultaneously. As two recent federal court decisions based on Texas law demonstrate, trade secrets law can sometimes protect employers where confidentiality agreements cannot. These cases also highlight the potential for very large exposure of violators.
On July 26, 2012, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas entered a final judgment in the amount of $15,873,383 in favor of TXCO Resources, Inc. and against Peregrine Petroleum, L.L.C. for misappropriation of trade secrets. TXCO Res., Inc. v. Peregrine Petroleum, L.L.C. (In re TXCO Res., Inc.), 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 3425 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. July 26, 2012). Both TXCO and Peregrine are oil and gas companies based in Texas. Peregrine signed a confidentiality agreement that allowed it to obtain information about certain of TXCO’s properties. TXCO alleged that Peregrine breached the confidentiality agreement and misappropriated TXCO’s trade secrets, among other causes of action. In a lengthy opinion issued after a 41-day bench trial, the Court found Peregrine was not liable for breach of the confidentiality agreement since TXCO could not prove that its damages were proximately caused by Peregrine’s breach. The Court did find, however, that Peregrine misappropriated TXCO’s trade secrets by using confidential information about TXCO’s land subsurface data, production data and operations data to acquire oil and gas leases formerly held by TXCO, which gave Peregrine a competitive advantage over TXCO and other companies.
In Raytheon Co. v. Indigo Sys. Corp., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 15892 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2012), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the decision of the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Texas, which granted summary judgment against a misappropriation of trade secrets claim to Indigo and against Raytheon. Raytheon and Indigo, who are both manufacturers of infrared imaging equipment, entered into a series of confidentiality agreements in 1996 in connection with consulting services to be provided by Indigo to Raytheon. In 1997, Raytheon became concerned that Indigo was recruiting Raytheon personnel to gain access to Raytheon’s trade secrets, but Indigo assured Raytheon that these accusations were baseless. Five years later, in 2007, Raytheon disassembled a camera of Indigo’s and discovered evidence of patent infringement and trade secret misappropriation and quickly brought suit.
In granting summary judgment to Indigo, the district court found that the confidentiality agreements were unrelated to the infrared technology at issue and found that Raytheon’s trade secret claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations under Texas law. The appellate court discussed the “discovery rule,” which allows tolling for claims of trade secret misappropriation until when the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the facts that give rise to the claim. The court also noted that the question of whether Raytheon “should have known” about its claims earlier was for the jury. The Circuit Court held that the district court erred by resolving this factual question against Raytheon, the non-moving party, at summary judgment.
BURR POINT: Trade secrets violations can lead to large judgments and the “discovery rule” can be used to preserve the ability to obtain these judgments for older claims.
In the hilarious movie Dumb and Dumber, the imbecilic and unattractive character played by Jim Carrey is told by the beautiful woman he is pursuing that the chances of them winding up together are about one in a million, to which he excitedly replies, “So you’re telling me there’s a chance!” Similarly, if an employer wants to enjoin a former employee from working for a competitor, but the employee is not under any sort of non-compete agreement with the former employer, has taken no company records and property, and has not revealed any confidential information or trade secrets to the new employer, the inevitable disclosure doctrine of trade secrets law provides the employer with at least a “chance” of getting the desired injunction.
The inevitable disclosure doctrine is used by employers to stop former employees from working for competitors, even in the absence of a non-compete agreement, on the basis that it is inevitable that the employee will use or disclose the former employer’s trade secrets in connection with the new employment. The significance of this theory is that the employer is not required to prove an actual misappropriation of a trade secret, but rather that the disclosure of the trade secret is inevitable based on the nature of the information and the circumstances of the employee’s new position.
As with all trade secret issues, the law on inevitable disclosure varies somewhat from state to state. For instance, California courts have rejected the doctrine as creating a “de facto covenant not to compete”, Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 1999), and held that the doctrine “cannot be used as a substitute for proving actual or threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.” Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 294 (4th Dist. 2002). The Third Circuit Federal Court of Appeals, however, applied a relatively lenient standard under Pennsylvania law for successfully using the theory, holding that an employer need only show a “substantial likelihood” of disclosure of a trade secret. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102,110 (3d Cir. 2010). (For an excellent nationwide survey of the doctrine, see Ryan A. Wiesner, A State-by-State Analysis of Inevitable Disclosure: A Need for Uniformity and a Workable Standard, 16 Intellectual Property L. Rev. 211 (2012)).
The Georgia Supreme Court has recognized the inevitable disclosure doctrine, although not referring to it by name, in the case of Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Corp., 269 Ga. 553, 501 S.E. 2d 501 (1998). In that opinion, the court upheld the trial court’s injunction prohibiting Southwire’s former employee from working for Southwire’s direct competitor’s logistics department for a period of five years. As the basis for its ruling, the court concluded that the competitor had “sought to obtain, by the simple act of hiring [Southwire’s former employee], all the logistics information it had taken Southwire millions of dollars and years of testing and modifications to develop as part of Southwire’s plan to acquire a competitive edge over other cable and wire companies ….” Id. at 557. There was neither mention in the opinion of the employee having a non-compete agreement nor any mention of an actual misappropriation by the employee of the alleged trade secret. Instead, the implication of the decision was that disclosure of Southwire’s logistics system was inevitable because of the identity of Southwire and its competitor’s business.
BURR POINT: Even in the absence of an enforceable non-compete agreement, the inevitable disclosure doctrine provides a means for enjoining a former employee’s competitive activities in certain circumstances. For more information on the inevitable disclosure doctrine or how it might apply to your business, don’t hesitate to contact one of the Burr & Forman team members.
In golf, a hacker who slices his tee shot into the woods will often announce that he’s going to take a “mulligan”, i.e., hit another ball as if the first one never happened. Georgia’s General Assembly took a legislative mulligan in re-enacting its new non-compete statute, and a recent Eleventh Circuit opinion, Becham v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11225 (11th Cir. 2012), should make the folks under the Gold Dome glad they did.
In 2009, the Georgia General Assembly passed HB 173, which was a bill designed to make non-compete agreements and other post-employment restrictive covenants much easier for employers to enforce. The effectiveness of HB 173 was dependent upon a positive ratification by Georgia voters of a state constitutional amendment authorizing the new law. In November 2010, Georgia voters passed the amendment by a 2-1 margin. Because HB 173 specifically stated that it would become effective the day after ratification of the amendment, legislators, lawyers and employers all assumed that Georgia finally had its new employer-friendly non-compete statute in place as of November 3, 2010.
Shortly after the ratification of the amendment, however, some non-compete attorneys and commentators, including this author, began to have serious concerns about the effectiveness of the new law due to a discrepancy between the effective date of the new law, November 3, 2010, and the effective date of the constitutional amendment, which by law was January 1, 2011 (because the amendment, due to a legislative oversight, did not have a specified effective date). The analysis was that because the new statute was not constitutionally authorized on the date it became effective, it was unconstitutional and could not be revived by the later effectiveness of the amendment. This author shared the concerns of practitioners with the sponsor of HB 173, Rep. Wendell Willard, and he eventually concluded that the statute needed to be re-passed in the next session in an abundance of caution. (Go here for a discussion between the author and Rep. Willard about the events leading up to re-passage of the bill).
Thus, in 2011, the General Assembly passed a new bill, HB 30 (codified at OCGA §13-8-50 et seq.), that was essentially identical to the 2009 bill. This new statute, however, by its terms only applied to agreements executed on or after the new effective date of May 11, 2011. This left some uncertainty about how Courts would treat non-compete agreements executed during the legislative twilight zone period between the effective dates of the first and second versions of the new non-compete statute. Would courts give any deference to employers who had their employees execute new non-competes in reliance upon the much ballyhooed passage of the new statute?
That question was answered in the negative by the Eleventh Circuit in the recent Becham opinion. In that case, an employer was attempting to enforce a non-compete agreement dated December 1, 2010, after the ratification of the constitutional amendment and the effective date of HB 173, but before the effective date of the corrective 2011 statute. In affirming the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employee-defendant, the Eleventh Circuit held that “HB 173 was unconstitutional and void the moment it went into effect”, thus confirming the analysis of the practitioners who first reached out to the bill sponsor. The effect of that ruling was that the Court applied the much more onerous pre-statute body of Georgia non-compete law, and the plaintiff’s non-compete covenants were held to be unenforceable
BURR POINT: The Georgia lawmakers’ nimble legislative repair of its previous misstep on the timing of the new non-compete statute means that all’s well that ends well, unless you’re an employer caught in the gap of the effective dates of the two versions of the law. For Georgia employers, it is now clear that your non-competes must be executed on or after May 11, 2011, in order to take advantage of the more lenient new statute. For more information or help further understanding the changes to Georgia’s non-compete laws, contact a member of Burr & Forman’s Non-Compete and Trade Secrets team.
Employers seeking to limit employees from taking customers with them to new jobs should consider including “garden leave” provisions in their form employment agreements, in addition to or in place of the more traditional non-compete and non-solicitation covenants. A garden leave clause requires an employee to provide a certain period of notice to the employer before voluntarily terminating employment (usually 30-60 days) and restricts the employee from competing against his or her employer during the notice period. During the notice period, the employee is paid full salary and benefits and is usually directed not to report to work during the notice period. Thus, the “garden leave” term comes from the notion that, at least metaphorically, the employee will stay at home and tend to his garden during the restricted period, while the employer secures relationships with its customers before the employee goes to work for a competitor.
The potential benefit to garden leave clauses is that they are viewed more favorably by Courts from an enforcement standpoint because the employee is still being paid during the restricted period. Because the concept is relatively new in the United States (as opposed to its common use in the United Kingdom), there is not a lot of case law guidance about their enforceability. As with non-competes, the law controlling these provisions is very jurisdiction-specific. For example, garden leave provisions have been regularly enforced in New York. See Estee Lauder Co. v. Batra, 430 F. Supp. 2d 158, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (granting preliminary injunction of five months against employee in charge of developing strategies for certain brands of employer’s skin care products and finding that risk of employee’s “loss of livelihood is entirely mitigated by the fact that [employer] will continue to pay [his] salary of $375,000 per year for the duration of the ‘sitting out’ period”); Ayco Co., L.P. v. Frisch, 795 F. Supp. 2d 193, 197 (N.D.N.Y 2011) (granting preliminary injunction against employee financial advisors and finding that agreement by employees to “give [employer] ninety days notice of termination, during which time they would remain . . . employees and continue to receive their base salary or salary draw, but would no longer participate in [employer’s] compensation plan” was enforceable).
The law in the Southeast is significantly less developed. The last word in Georgia, for instance, came in Carvalho v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80651 (N.D. Ga. October 31, 2007). Carvalho indicates that courts applying Georgia law may view garden leave provisions less favorably than those applying New York law. In Carvalho, the Northern District of Georgia considered the enforceability of a garden leave provision, which provided that the employees were entitled to their base salary and benefits during an unspecified notice period. The court denied a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, reasoning that “[t]he income of these employees is substantially higher than their base salary [and] the employer has the ability to significantly reduce their income and prohibit them from working for another employer of any kind during the notice period.” The Court also expressed doubt as to whether the covenant was enforceable in light of Georgia’s at will employment standard codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1, reasoning that “because the employee may resign at any time, the Court questions whether he can be ordered to continue in his employment, especially under less favorable terms of employment.”
BURR POINT: Employers should consider adding garden leave provisions in addition to or in place of non-compete provisions in employment contracts.
If you would like to add a garden leave provision to your employee agreements, the Burr & Forman team would be happy to assist you. Please contact us at any time.
An employer seeking to stop or slow down a former employee who is unfairly competing with business needs to examine every possible legal claim as options to use against the employee. In many cases, the employee spent time laying the groundwork for new employment or business ventures while still employed by the previous employer. These situations present another legal opportunity to employers, in addition to the usual considerations of non-compete, non-solicitation and trade secret violation claims. The employer and its attorney should consider a claim against the former employee based on a common provision in employment contracts: the requirement that the employee devote his “full time and attention” (or similar language) to the employment.
There’s not a lot of case law interpreting these provisions, but the cases that do show that this boilerplate language can potentially provide another arrow in the employer’s quiver. In example:
- A doctor who spent time managing his rental property business instead of seeing patients during office hours was potentially liable to his employer for failing to devote his “full, entire and undivided professional time and attention” to his employer. See Bhandari v. Southwest Community Health Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37750 (D.N.M. 2011).
- A casino-building company was allowed to maintain a suit against its CEO for breach of fiduciary duty based upon a “full time and attention” clause where the CEO was allegedly doing consulting work on the side for a company that built water processing systems, collecting over $600,000 for such work. See Endacott v. Int’l Hospitality, Inc., 910 So. 2d 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2005).
- A CFO who concocted a plan to take over his employer using insider knowledge was held to have breached his contractual obligation to “devote his full business time and attention and best efforts” to his duties for the employer. See Lydall, Inc. v. Ruschmeyer, 282 Conn. 209 (Conn. 2007)
BURR POINT: While non-compete claims focus on what an employee did after they left their employment, the employee’s activities prior to their departure could lead to a claim for breaching a contractual duty to devote their “full time and attention” to the former employer’s business.
Results Matter Radio host Lee Kantor sat down last week with State Representative Wendell Willard and Burr & Forman attorney Chip Collins to discuss the ins and outs of Georgia’s new non-compete employment statute.
Although Georgia has only recently enacted a non-compete statute, it’s not from lack of trying. Rep. Willard, the sponsor of the bill that became the new statute, discussed the difficulty that Georgia has faced trying to codify non-compete standards. Georgia first passed a non-compete statute in 1989, only to have it ruled unconstitutional by the Georgia Supreme Court shortly thereafter. The state legislature passed another non-compete statute in 2009, which was supposed to become effective upon a majority referendum vote in November 2010 for a constitutional change that would authorize the new statute. Following the approval of the referendum, however, Collins raised with Rep. Willard some technical concerns that he and other practitioners had with the new statute that potentially exposed it to a legal challenge. As a result of those concerns, Rep. Willard sponsored what was essentially a re-passage of the statute in the 2011 legislative session, and Gov. Deal signed it into effect on May 11, 2011. The new statute is codified at OCGA § 13-8-50 and applies to all non-compete agreements signed after May 11, 2011.
Collins and Willard agreed that the new statute dramatically shifts the legal landscape of Georgia’s non-compete law in favor of employers, with perhaps the biggest impact being a Court’s ability under the new statute to “blue-pencil”, or modify, an overbroad agreement. Under the pre-statute rules, non-compete agreements were often deemed unenforceable by trial courts for being overbroad in scope—either in terms of duration, territory, or restricted activities. Now, however, almost any non-compete is potentially enforceable, at least to a degree deemed reasonable by the court tasked with enforcing it.
As reassuring as the effects of Georgia’s new non-compete law may be for employers, Collins and Rep. Willard give a strong warning to employers that this new statute only applies to non-compete agreements signed after May 11, 2011; the old pro-employee rules still apply to any agreements that pre-date the statute. Thus, if you are an employer who has not had a new agreement drafted and executed by your employees in the last year, they urge you to do so as soon as possible.
Wendell Willard, State Representative 49th District Georgia House of Representatives, is the co-sponsor of Georgia’s new non-compete employment statute that became effective last year and drastically changed the legal landscape for non-competes. Read more about the Georgia House of Representatives.
William (Chip) Collins, Jr. is the attorney who heads Burr and Forman’s new non-compete and trade secrets group. He continues to successfully help businesses of all types prevent unfair competition. Read more about Chip and his experience on the Burr & Forman site.
Burr & Forman LLP’s Results Matter Radio brings you pertinent business information and real life solutions to help drive desired results for you – whatever your business may be. Please join us right here every Tuesday 10:00 am Eastern for our LIVE Broadcast, and CLICK HERE to listen to our Archived Shows anytime.
Want more information on non-compete agreements and state legislation? Contact Burr & Forman for more insights on the enforceability of non-compete clauses.
Early Court Opinions Construing Georgia’s New Non-Compete Statute Confirm Need For Employers to Have Employees Execute New Agreements
As previously reported by this commentator and others, Georgia enacted a new non-compete statute (O.C.G.A. §13-8-50 et seq.), effective May 11, 2011, which drastically alters non-compete agreements in Georgia. Georgia was previously one of the most difficult states in which to enforce a non-compete agreement, but overnight, Georgia law and public policy changed to become more favorable to employers. The most significant deviation from the prior law is that courts are now allowed to judicially modify (“blue-pencil”) non-compete agreements that are deemed to be overbroad. Before this change, Georgia court had no choice but to rule as void any non-compete that did not meet Georgia’s strict drafting requirements. Thus, under the new statute, any agreement is potentially enforceable to some degree. The one catch with the statute is that it only applies to non-compete agreements executed on or after the effective date.
While the new statute was favorably received by Georgia employers, it immediately raised at least two questions for attorneys practicing in the non-compete arena: (1) How would judges use their new found blue-pencil powers for agreements they deemed to be overbroad? and (2) Would courts give any deference to Georgia’s new pro non-compete public policy in interpreting and enforcing non-compete agreements that pre-date the effective date of the statute, even though technically it’s not applicable to those agreements? Eight months into life under the new statute, those questions are starting to get answered, as evidenced by two opinions by Judge Story of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Judge Story’s ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction in Pointenorth Insurance Company v. Zander (2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11341) provides the first published opinion wherein a court applied the new statute and used the judicial “blue pencil” to modify and then enforce a no-compete agreement. In this case, the plaintiff-employer sued a former employee to enforce a customer non-solicitation covenant contained in an employment agreement dated May 11, 2011 (the effective date of Georgia’s new non-compete statute). Judge Story found the non-solicit provision to be overbroad because it purported to forbid the employee from soliciting “any of the Employer’s clients”, as opposed to just those with whom the customer interacted. In exercising the powers granted under the new statute, however, the court modified the non-solicit provision to apply only to customers that the former employee “contacted and assisted” while employed with the plaintiff and granted the requested injunction in accordance with the blue-penciled terms of the agreement.
Another ruling by Judge Story, however, highlights the answer (in the negative) to the question of whether the new public policy would have any effect on non-compete agreements pre-dating effective date of the new statute. In Boone v. Corestaff Support Services, Inc. (2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85454 (N.D.Ga. 2011)), the court reconsidered a previous decision and held that Georgia’s new non-compete statute, and the employer-friendly public policy it embodies, cannot apply in any way in interpreting and enforcing a non-compete executed prior to the statute. For the agreements drafted prior to the statute, the more-strict prior rules apply, regardless of whether the outcome may be vastly different than if the new statue applied. In so holding, Judge Story followed the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in Bunker Hill Int’l, Ltd. v. Nationsbuilder Ins. Servs, Inc., (309 Ga. App. 503, 710 S.E. 2d. 662 (2011)). This same conclusion has subsequently been reached by other Federal District Court judges and appellate panels in the state. See Fantastic Sams Salons Corp. v. Maxie Enterprises, Inc., (2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8106 (N.D.Ga. 2012)); Hix v. Aon Risk Servs. South, Inc., (2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134569 (N.D. Ga. 2011)); Murphree v. Yancey Bros. Co. (311 Ga. App. 744, 716 S.E. 2d. 824 (2011)).
BURR POINT: The early indication is that courts in Georgia are readily willing to use their new statutory power to judicially modify overbroad non-compete agreements, but only for those agreements executed on or after the effective date of the statute (May 11, 2011). Any older agreements will still be reviewed under the previous statutes with no help from the newly declared pro non-compete public policy. Accordingly, Georgia employers should consult an attorney to assist them in having employees under non-compete agreements predating May 11, 2011, execute new agreements.
In increasingly competitive business environments consisting of mobile and tech-savvy workforces, employers need to take full advantage of the most important protection available against unfair competition by former employees: a comprehensive and effective non-compete agreement. Employers should have non-compete agreements reviewed and/or drafted by an attorney familiar with the laws of any state that the agreement will be active in (usually the states in which employees reside). This is especially important because the laws governing non-compete agreements vary from state to state.
However, regardless of state, the key ingredients to a successful and protective agreement include the following types of provisions:
- Non-Competes — While a “Non-Compete Agreement” usually refers to an employment contract that includes many of the provisions in this list, an actual non-compete provision is the one that actually prohibits an employee from working for a competitor. To be enforceable, this type of provision typically must be reasonable in terms of the duration, the territory, and the scope of prohibited activities. What is deemed reasonable varies from state-to-state and is often fact-specific based on the circumstances of each particular employee.
- Non-Solicitation of Customers — In a world where anyone on the globe is potentially accessible by email or cellphone, an employer’s vulnerability to competition is often defined not by geography but by customers. Accordingly, a provision for the non-solicitation of customers is essential for most modern businesses. A non-solicitation covenant does not by itself prevent an employee for working for a competitor, but rather it prohibits an employee from affirmatively soliciting the customers of the former employer. A non-solicitation provision often works in tandem with a non-compete clause, but a non-solicitation term is a must where employees are reluctant to agree to an absolute prohibition from competing in a certain area.
- Confidentiality/Non-Disclosure — These provisions limit an employee’s ability to use or disclose non-public information relating to the employer’s business and customers. Even in the absence of a non-compete or non-solicitation provision, confidentiality agreements can be used to hinder unfair competition and solicitation of customers by a former employee if it can be shown that the employee is using the confidential business information from the former employer. Additionally, confidentiality agreements are usually necessary, at minimum, to prove the key element of a claim for a trade secret violation: efforts to maintain the “secrecy” of a purported trade secret.
- Non-Recruitment — A non-recruitment provision seeks to limit a former employee’s ability to recruit other employees away from the employer. There are few common law and statutory restrictions on the recruitment of a company’s employees, so these types of covenants are an important tool for staving off mass defections.
- Return of Property — Many post-employment problems can be avoided, or grounds for a remedy improved upon if there is a problem, by a contract requiring that an employee return all company-related property, information, or documents obtained or created by the employee upon termination of the employment relationship.
BURR POINT: While there are multiple other terms that are a part of a well-drafted non-compete agreement, the list above provides the backbone terms that will serve as protection for the employer.
Most businesses are familiar with the concept of a trade secret, but few can accurately define the legal meaning of the term. Those seeking protection will claim that basically all of their business information qualifies as a trade secret, while defendants fighting a claim will argue that the requirements for something to be a trade secret are extremely restrictive. The answer, of course, is somewhere in the middle. So, what exactly constitutes a trade secret?
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been adopted by 46 states (all except New York, Massachusetts, North Carolina and Texas). Georgia’s version of the Act defines a trade secret as follows:
“Trade secret” means information, without regard to form, including, but not limited to, technical or nontechnical data, a formula, a pattern, a compilation, a program, a device, a method, a technique, a drawing, a process, financial data, financial plans, product plans, or a list of actual or potential customers or suppliers which is not commonly known by or available to the public and which information:
(A) Derives economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Whether or not a supposed trade secret satisfies the definition of a trade secret often decides the winners and losers in trade secret disputes. Here are some examples of decisions by state and Federal courts in Georgia regarding the determination of a trade secret:
Items Ruled as Trade Secrets
- Written, or electronically-stored, customer lists, if not readily available to the public
- Computer software
- Packaging idea
- Logistics system
- Healthcare provider’s referral log and workbook containing doctor referral statistics
Not a Trade Secret
- Intangible customer information existing in the mind of the former employee
- Recollection of cities that franchisor considered to be good location for future franchises (deemed to be similar to intangible customer information, and thus not protectable)
- Accumulated technical information in employee’s mind
- A particular bearing in a cleaning system (since bearing was stamped with the name of a third party, anyone could call the bearing manufacturer to find out the specifications of the bearing)
- Name for future newspaper planned by publisher
- Matters generally known in the industry
- Process of evaluating amount to bid on tax deeds (the information was available to the public, and the process was not a unique combination affording possessor a competitive advantage)
- A customer list that does not provide a competitive advantage (even though it was not publicly available)
- Investor lists
BURR POINT: The Uniform Trade Secret Act can be a powerful tool for protecting a confidential business and customer information, but claiming a trade secret and meeting the legal definition of same are two different matters. Businesses of all types would be well-served to have an attorney review their processes, employment agreements and policies to ensure they are set up to take full advantage of the protection that trade secrets laws provide.