Eight-Figure Judgments in Trade Secret Cases – Do We Have Your Attention Now?

The conventional wisdom among attorneys and litigants in the noncompete and trade secret arena is that the cases are all about the injunctions, usually at the TRO and interlocutory injunction stage.  Some judgments handed down around the country in the last month, however, prove that the damages portion of these cases can be just as devastating to a defendant deemed to be unfairly competing.

In my home state of Georgia, a Savannah jury rendered a $30 million verdict in favor of an energy services company in a suit against its former president and other executives.  The plaintiff alleged, and the jury obviously agreed, that some of the defendants stole trade secrets and wrongfully solicited customers as part of a conspiracy to “hit the ground running” upon jumping ship to their former employer’s rivals.

In St. Louis, a state court judge slammed a husband-wife team with a judgment of $10MM — $1.6MM in compensatory damages and $8.4MM in punitives — for misappropriating trade secrets from the husband’s former employer and working with a Chinese company to make and sell imitations of the plaintiff’s products — coatings for microchips.  The plaintiff and their attorneys, however, should hold off on the down payments for the victory Porsches — the defendants are reportedly nowhere to be found and may have left the country, most likely with pockets full of coated microchips.

Finally, a long-running, tank battle-like suit between two rival software companies finally ended (not counting the likely appeal) with the original plaintiff getting hit by a Nebraska jury with a $43.8MM award on the defendant’s counterclaim.  The plaintiff started the litigation by suing its rival for alleged software pirating, and those claims were rejected by a jury last year.  The defendant counterclaimed for breach of a nondisclosure agreement (entered, ironically, to try and head off the plaintiff’s pirating claims), antitrust violations, and tortious interference with business relationships, resulting in the crippling verdict. The moral of this story is that if you pick a fight, as the plaintiff did here, you better be prepared to finish it.

BURR POINT:  Former employees and businesses who are inclined to push the envelope on restrictive covenant agreements (“I’ll just do it until a judge shuts me down”) should be mindful of the potential exposure for tens of millions of dollars in compensatory damages, attorney’s fees and punitive damages to a party who thinks they’ve been wronged.

Supreme Court Strikes Down New Defense to Inducing Patent Infringement

Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (No. 13-896)

On May 26, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. (No. 13-896), rejecting the accused patent infringer’s argument that a good faith belief that the patent is invalid is a defense to induced infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). In the majority opinion by Justice Kennedy,[1] the Court confirmed its previous holding in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. __ (2011) that to be liable for inducing infringement the inducer must have knowledge (1) of the patent, and (2) that the induced acts constitute infringement. Slip Op.at 6. Thus, if the alleged inducer reasonably believes that the acts it induces are not infringing, there can be no liability for inducing infringement. Slip Op. at 9. The accused inducer in this case, Cisco, argued that a good faith belief that the patent is invalid should likewise preclude a finding of inducement because an invalid patent cannot be infringed, and a belief of invalidity therefore negates any knowledge that the induced acts constitute infringement.

The majority rejected this argument for several reasons. First, the majority notes that the Patent Act treats infringement and invalidity separately. The infringement statute, Section 271, is found in Part III of the Act, entitled “Patents and the Protection of Patent Rights,” while the patentability statutes, Sections 101, 102, and 103, etc., are in Part II, entitled “Patentability of Inventions and Grants of Patents.” See Slip Op. at 10. Second, the majority further noted that non-infringement and invalidity are listed as separate defenses under Section 282, and allowing a good faith belief of invalidity to defeat an inducement claim would contradict the presumption of validity that issued patents enjoy pursuant to that section. See Slip Op. at 10. Because patents are presumed valid, they must be proved invalid by clear and convincing evidence, as opposed to the lower preponderance-of-the-evidence standard used for proving infringement. According to the majority, this difference further dictates that infringement and invalidity should not be conflated. See Slip Op. at 10. Lastly, the majority noted that allowing the defense would make litigation more burdensome and confuse juries by making them distinguish between the defendant’s belief regarding validity and the actual issue of validity. See Slip Op. at 12.

Interestingly, the majority went out of its way to note that accused infringers still have multiple ways to defend against frivolous patent infringement claims, especially claims by patent assertion entities or “trolls.” The majority stressed that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 35 U.S.C. § 285 allow district courts to award sanctions and attorney fees against parties who bring frivolous cases. Slip Op. at 14. According to the majority, these deterrents, combined with post-grant review proceedings at the Patent Office, warrant maintaining the separation between infringement and validity.


[1] Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts dissented, while Justice Breyer did not take part in deciding the case.

SEC Sweep on NDAs Restricting Whistleblowers

The Wall Street Journal reported Thursday that the SEC is in the midst of a sweep to crack down on companies’ use of NDAs or employment agreements that might impede whistleblower reporting in violation of Dodd-Frank amendments. Wall St. J. at C1 (Feb. 26, 2015).

We reported last November on a letter from eight House Democrats asking the SEC to examine the issue, here. SEC Chair White’s January 5 response is here.

SEC Rules prohibit using agreements to restrict or prevent whistleblower reporting. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17(a). And the SEC’s broadened administrative jurisdiction now gives it the ability to reach beyond public-companies and registrants. Relatedly, FINRA required its member broker-dealers to include “whistleblower” clause in all settlement and confidentiality agreements.’

Separately, NY Attorney General Schneiderman announced this week legislation to create the State’s own whistleblower program. The “Financial Frauds Whistleblower Act” would award 10-30% of financial-services fraud sanctions of $1 million and over. The proposed Act also would guarantee whistleblower confidentiality and prohibit retaliation. It is being touted as even stronger than federal standards.

Employers should review their employee confidentiality provisions (in any form, including policy manuals and severance agreements) for a “tune up” to ensure they comply.


Thomas K. Potter, III (tpotter@burr.com) is a partner in the Securities Litigation Practice Group at Burr & Forman, LLP. Managing Partner of the Nashville office, Tom is licensed in Tennessee, Texas and Louisiana. He has over 28 years’ experience representing financial institutions in litigation, regulatory and compliance matters.

© 2015 by Thomas K. Potter, III (all rights reserved)

Business Method Patents Live! – Federal Circuit Finds First Patent That Survives Post-Alice Analysis

DDR Holdings, LLC. v. Hotels.com, L.P., et al.,

No. 2013-1505 (December 5, 2014) (Wallach, Mayer, and Chen)

Since the Supreme Court issued its June 2014 decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,[1] federal district courts, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and the United States Patent & Trademark Office have been invalidating patent claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101 at an unprecedented rate. But on December 5, 2014, the Federal Circuit bucked the recent trend, ruling for the first time that a challenged claim is patent-eligible under the analysis set forth in Alice.

The patentee, DDR Holdings, LLC (“DDR”), is the assignee of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,993,572 (“the ‘572 patent”) and 7,818,399 (“the ‘399 patent”), which relate to generating a composite web page that combines a host website with content of a third-party merchant. Many web pages include advertisements from third-party merchants that, when clicked on by a customer, re-direct the customer to the merchant’s website, and away from the host website. In order to eliminate the host website’s lost web traffic, DDR’s patents disclose a system that generates a composite webpage that displays product information from the third-party merchant but retains the host website’s “look and feel.” Slip Op. at 3-4. At the trial court, the defendants argued that DDR’s patents are invalid for, among other reasons, claiming patent-ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. The lower court denied the motion, and a split panel of the Federal Circuit affirmed.

Writing for the majority, Judge Chen applied the two-step analysis set forth in Alice to determine that DDR’s claims are patent-eligible. Under the first step–whether the claims are directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea–the majority did not explicitly answer the question, but instead noted that under any of the alleged underlying abstract ideas proposed by the defendants and the dissent, the claims are patent-eligible because they satisfy the second step of the test. In particular, the defendants argued that the claims were directed to the abstract ideas of “making two web pages look the same,” “syndicated commerce on the computer using the Internet,” and “making two e-commerce web pages look alike by using licensed trademarks, logos, color schemes, and layouts.” Slip Op. at 19. Dissenting Judge Mayer described the claims as directed to the business goal “that an online merchant’s sales can be increased if two web pages have the same ‘look and feel.’” Dissenting Op. at 2. The majority found that regardless of which definition of the abstract idea is adopted, the claims are patent-eligible under the second step of the analysis.

Applying the second step of the analysis–whether the claim includes elements that transform the nature of the claim into a patent-eligible application of the abstract idea–the majority first noted that the claims at issue are “necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks,” and do not “merely recite the performance of some business practice known from the pre-Internet world along with the requirement to perform it on the Internet,” like the claims in Alice. Slip Op. at 20. The majority also disagreed with the dissent’s position that the claims were merely an Internet implementation of the well-known “store within a store” abstract concept. Id. at 21. In the well-known “brick and mortar” context, a physical warehouse store may include a kiosk selling third-party products. However, unlike what happens when an online customer clicks on a third-party advertisement, a customer in the physical warehouse store is not transported out of the store to a separate physical location associated with the third-party simply by walking up to the third-party kiosk. Id. at 22. According to the majority, the distinction is that in the cyberspace context, the customer is able to purchase the third-party product without any indication that they were previously at the host website, and is not required to return to the host website. The majority therefore concluded that the claims are not merely directed to a computer implementation of a well-known abstract concept, but address a problem specific to the Internet.

The majority was however careful to note that “not all claims purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id. Unlike the patent-ineligible claims in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC,[2] which used the Internet in its conventional fashion to implement a method of offering media content in exchange for viewing an advertisement, DDR’s claims change the normal operation of the Internet that occurs when a user clicks on a third-party advertisement. Id. at 22-23. The majority further noted that the claims also do not attempt to preempt every application of the idea of increasing sales by making two web pages look the same, instead reciting a specific way to automate the generation of a composite website by an outsource provider. Id. at 23.

While this case hardly re-opens the flood gates for business method and software-related patents, it should at least provide some hope to patent owners and applicants that Alice has not killed off this entire segment of patents. As articulated in Alice, this case confirms that patents related to improving the functionality of a computer or the Internet–as opposed to improving a preexisting concept by implementing the concept using computers or the Internet–may have a chance at surviving a § 101 challenge. However, given the split panel decision, this case may be headed for en banc review by the full Federal Circuit, so the glimmer of hope may be short-lived.


[1] 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).

[2] __ F.3d __, 2014 WL 5904902 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 2014).

Federal Circuit Reverses Course, Affirms Patent Ineligibility Ruling in View of Surpreme Court Alice Decision

Ultramercial, Inc. et al. v. Hulu, LLC, et al.,

No. 2010-1544 (November 14, 2014) (Lourie, Mayer, and O’Malley)

On November 14, 2014, after twice before reversing the lower court’s dismissal of Ultramercial’s complaint for failing to claim statutory subject matter, the Federal Circuit agreed with the lower court that Ultramercial’s patent claims are ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Applying the new test set forth in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014). the Federal Circuit found that Ultramercial’s claims directed to distributing copyrighted media over the Internet at no charge in exchange for viewing an advertisement, claimed nothing more than an ineligible abstract idea.

According to the two-step test, the court first determines whether the claims are directed to one of the three exceptions to patent-eligible subject matter: laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. If so, it is then determined whether the claim contains “an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. The additional elements must be more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity” in order to transform the abstract idea into patent-eligible subject matter. Slip. Op. at 10 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012)). The Federal Circuit found that Ultramercial’s claims are directed to the abstract idea of “showing an advertisement before delivering free content.” Slip. Op. at 10. Although the claims included limitations such as the user selecting the advertisement to view, and recording the transaction in an activity log, the Court found that these limitations merely add a degree of particularity but the claim as a whole is still devoid of a concrete or tangible application. The Court was careful to note that not all software-based patent claims are directed to abstract ideas, but agreed with the lower court in this case that the claims are directed to the abstract idea of “using advertising as an exchange or currency.” Id.

Moving to the second step of the analysis, the Federal Circuit examined the remaining claim limitations to determine whether they constitute an “inventive concept” that renders the claim patent-eligible. The Court found that the majority of the eleven claimed steps are merely incidental to the abstract concept of offering media content in exchange for viewing an advertisement (e.g., receiving the media content, selecting the advertisement, making the content available subject to the condition that the consumer views the advertisement, displaying the advertisement, allowing access to the content, and receiving payment from the advertiser). The additional steps of updating an activity log, requiring a request from the user to view the advertisement, restricting public access, and using the Internet, are merely conventional steps that are “insufficient to supply an inventive concept.” Slip. Op. at 11. Although not necessary to finding the claims patent-ineligible, the Court also noted that the claims fail the machine-or-transformation test because the claims are not tied to particular machine or apparatus and do not transform a particular article into a different state or thing.

Writing in concurrence, Judge Mayer made several interesting points with respect to patent eligibility. First, Judge Mayer encouraged lower courts to address patent eligibility at the outset of litigation–like the trial court in this case did–to conserve judicial resources, reduce vexatious litigation by resolving disputes before engaging in expensive discovery, and to free the public from innovation-stifling patents. Second, Judge Mayer argues that no presumption of validity should attach when conducting a section 101 analysis, unlike the presumption of validity for prior art challenges. Third, Judge Mayer interprets Alice as essentially implementing a “technological arts” test. Judge Mayer’s interpretation relies on the Supreme Court’s finding claims ineligible where they did not “improve the functioning of the computer itself” or “effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359. Under this interpretation advances in non-technical disciplines such as business, law, or the social sciences––seemingly, any business method patent–– would be patent-ineligible.

The Ultramercial decision is not surprising given the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice, and the recent flood of decisions invalidating patent claims on patent-eligibility grounds. The most interesting aspects of the case come from Judge Mayer’s concurrence arguing that there is no presumption of patent-eligibility and that the issue of patent-eligibility should be determined at the outset of litigation. Over the last several months, district courts have decided the patent-eligibility issue at the pleadings stage with increased frequency, as opposed to on summary judgment. Judge Mayer’s concurrence further encouraging this practice should result in even more trial courts addressing the issue earlier in litigation.

Federal Trade Secrets Protection — Finally Something Both Parties Can Agree On

In recent months, two bipartisan bills have been introduced in Congress providing for a Federal civil remedy for trade secret misappropriation — the Defend Trade Secrets Act , introduced in the Senate in April, and the Trade Secrets Protection Act, introduced in the House in July.   These companion bills are substantively similar in that they both amend the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 to establish a private right of action for a trade secret violation.  So far, the House bill is moving faster, having been approved on September 17, 2014, by the House Judiciary Committee and presumably moving toward a full House vote in the near future (or at least that’s what I learned on School House Rock).

The significance of these bills is that they finally extend Federal civil protection and regulation to trade secrets, currently the only category of intellectual property not so covered (copyrights, trademarks, and patents already have Federal protection).  The practical effect of these bills, if passed, will not be as game-changing as the casual observer might think, however.   The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the “UTSA”) was first published in 1979, amended in 1985, and has been adopted by 47 states in some form, so civil remedies currently exist for trade secret theft and are similar to that offered in these two Federal bills.  Moreover, trade secret claims arising under state law often wind up in Federal Court based on diversity jurisdiction, so the access to Federal Courts is not as big of a deal as the bill sponsors might make it out to be.

Despite the similarities to the existing body of state statutes, however, the new bills, if passed, would certainly provide a new, improved hammer with which companies can pound unfair competitors and deceitful former employees. Some advantages of the proposed bills over the current state statutes based on the UTSA include the following:

  • Strong statement that trade secret protection is an important U.S. public policy;
  • Uniformity in trade secret law across the country;
  • Direct access to Federal Courts, regardless of the location of the parties or amount in controversy;
  • Longer statute of limitations;
  • Increased recoverable damages; and
  • Procedures for ex parte seizure of evidence.

BURR POINT: Rare bipartisan support, similar bills in both the House and Senate, and a quick and favorable reporting out of the House Judiciary point to Federal trade secrets legislation being something that this hamstrung Congress might actually be able to pass.

Ice Storms, My Secret Internet and Other Myths

Winter is around the corner.  On the calendar, however, it’s not yet here.  Surely Mother Nature is aware of this.  Still, an ice storm currently engulfs large swaths of our nation and is leaving many of us without power or heat.  If your new business was recently served with a lawsuit seeking an injunction against it to stop allegedly unlawful competition, then you can probably relate to those in the grips of the current storm.

The situation:  A successful closely held corporation sues a new competitor in its industry.  The complaint alleges that the new competitor hired a former employee with knowledge that the former employee and former employer had executed a non-competition agreement.  The complaint against the new competitor seeks an injunction.  If you’re familiar with this column, then you know that this scenario is rather commonplace.  Sometimes, however, the former employer/plaintiff can seek relief that a court deems unreasonable.  One such instance occurs with internet-based companies, or even with internet-reliant companies.

Here’s an example:  You own a company that sells goods over the internet.  You discover that your former employee is working for a new competitor seemingly in violation of his non-competition agreement.  Although there is no evidence that your business is damaged or will suffer damages as a result of the new competitor’s entry into the marketplace, your lawsuit seeks to enjoin the former employee from working for the competitor.  Your lawsuit also includes a claim against the new competitor for tortuous interference with your contract with the former employee.  So far, this legal action presents relatively straightforward issues.  Then you decide to make matters more complicated.

We often see former employers attempt to overreach when seeking damages.  You might, for instance, sue for alleged violation of trade secrets (claiming that the employee gave protected information to the new competitor).  Or you might sue for unfair and deceptive trade practices.  While this aggressive approach could potentially force the new competitor to agree to willingly close its business, it’s more likely than not that you’ve created a situation in which litigation (and associated litigation costs) could escalate.  Particularly with internet-based businesses, the capability to drive business to a particular website is seldom a secret.  While there are certainly professionals who claim that they can use unique search engine optimization (SEO) techniques to increase your exposure, many businesses discover that they can directly pay the search engines themselves to increase their traffic.  And that information is essentially available through the search engines for companies willing to pay for it.

As a result, your new competitor may actually get significant traffic to its website without ever attempting to steal your “trade secrets” in its efforts to do so.  Even if challenged, a “trade secret” that is dependent on information a search engine would otherwise make publicly available is difficult to uphold in court.  To some ˗ if your company is more financially capable of bearing the financial costs and personnel strain of the litigation storm ˗ this fight might seem worthwhile.  Consider, on the other hand, the possibility that if you lose in your efforts to prove unfair and deceptive trade practices you may actually have to pay prevailing party attorney’s fees and costs to the new competitor.  Why?  Because “deceptive and unfair trade practice” statutes usually contain clauses that allow courts to award prevailing party attorney’s fees and costs.  In other words, if the new competitor can hold on long enough to defeat your claim for deceptive and unfair trade practices, your company could end up paying your competitor’s legal bill (even if the court finds grounds to enter the injunction you sought).

Does that scenario denude or devalue your carefully drafted non-competition agreement?  No, it does not.  What the above scenario is intended to provide is a cautionary warning that when dealing with a pest, sometimes a fly swatter gives you a better result than a grenade.  Many times your well-pled motion for injunctive relief will achieve your business goals without having to prove the elements of the additional allegations.  Less cost to you, same effect on your newly-enjoined former-competitor.

Navigating the many laws and difficult language in the area of non-competition agreements can perplex even the most sophisticated business professionals.  This is the point in the blog when you are urged to seek refuge from this complexity with an attorney experienced in these issues and capable of both advising and litigating, if necessary.

If you would like additional information on non-compete agreements and trade secrets law, please contact one of the Burr & Forman Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members.

Huge Verdict in Trade Secrets Case

It’s a little out of this blog’s Southeastern focus area, but a $22.7MM verdict in a Minnesota trade secrets and non-compete case, as reported by the West Central Tribune at wctrib.comshould be a reminder to all employees and employers that a violation in this area of the law can have disastrous consequences for a defendant. The plaintiff, a dairy and food processing equipment company, successfully argued that two former employees took confidential equipment designs from the company’s computer systems and used them on behalf of a Wisconsin-based competitor, Cheese Systems, Inc. The new employer was also found liable for interference with current or prospective contracts.

Maybe it’s just me, but my mental image of the defendants is this.

If you would like additional information on non-compete agreements and trade secrets law, please contact one of the Burr & Forman Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members.

Seek Advice In Drafting Trade Secrets And Confidentiality Agreements

In an article recently posted at mondaq.com, Richard Stobbe provides several excellent examples of why employers should consult with their counsel when drafting trade secrets and confidentiality agreements, instead of copying cookie-cutter examples found on the internet.

In his article, Keeping Secrets: Trade Secrets and Confidentiality Agreements, Stobbe notes that many “off-the-shelf” agreements are drafted with terms that do not apply to the employer’s business or the specific transaction, or apply another state’s laws.  Also, many form agreements define key terms, such as “confidential information,” which an employer may not be aware of or understand.  The failure to strictly comply with these defined terms may render the agreement unenforceable.

The issues raised in Stobbe’s article are especially relevant for employers in Tennessee where agreements restricting trade are generally disfavored and strictly construed against the employer.  Rather than rely on form agreements, employers should consult with counsel to insure their non-compete, trade secrets, and confidentiality agreements comply with their state’s laws.

If you would like additional information on non-compete agreements and trade secrets law, please contact one of the Burr & Forman Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members.

Why Go to the Movies?

Summer has arrived.  The Hollywood blockbusters are here.  New animated features hit the big screens this week.  Superman is flying once more.  Sure, if the movies are your cup of tea, then summer is your annual thirst quencher.  However if you’re looking for drama, you need only scan the internet to find your daily dose of serious corporate espionage and the criminal theft of trade secrets from American corporations.

Just yesterday the San Francisco Chronicle ran a story of a scientist working on solar cell technology who pled guilty to several counts of wire fraud in an indictment claiming he stole trade secrets from his employer “and tried to take them to a competitor in China.”  The prosecutors in the case “estimate the total loss from the theft of trade secrets at nearly $22.7 million.”  The Telegraph – a British newspaper – reported this week that cyber espionage is rampant in the UK with “foreign hackers” secretly working in some companies for up to two years “discreetly stealing intellectual property.”  American newspapers recently published articles that our government systems are under constant attack not only from rogue hackers but also from foreign governments utilizing sophisticated programs and systems in an effort to steal American secrets and military information.  Same thing for recent stories of Chinese manufacturer Sinovel and two if its executives, recently indicted for alleged theft of wind turbine trade secrets.  Alleged financial loss to the owner of the trade secrets: approximately $800 million according to SecurityInfoWatch.com.

The problem is rampant and unlikely to go away.  Nor is this something new.  Corporate espionage likely began soon after the first business incorporated.  Of course, victimized businesses take little comfort knowing that others victims also exist.  So what can your company do to avoid, eliminate or minimize this potential loss?  First line of defense, of course, is education.  Educate the people in charge of monitoring the transmission of technical data on the best means to detect the “discreet stealing.”  Depending on the value of the intellectual property (and the potential loss to your business if a competitor was to receive the trade secret information without a license or without compensation), the potential losses could justify the investment in employees whose role is to oversee the data transferred to and from your company’s system.

As most of you who read this post already know, Florida employment is at will.  While termination for a discriminatory purpose is unlawful, termination for violation of company policies (or termination for violation of State or federal law) is common.  However, as these events (and the dozens of other recently reported events) indicate, the most difficult task for American companies lies in screening employees so as to minimize the possibility of trade secret theft, while at the same time ensuring that all potential employees are given an equal opportunity to apply for a position for which they are potentially qualified.

If your company faces a patient, technically savvy and stealthy employee, like the ones described who steal trade secrets with stealth for two years before they are discovered, a well-written policy is not likely to act as a significant deterrent.  On the other hand, Florida law specifically allows employers to create written policies regarding the protection of its trade secrets and to enforce those policies against its employees as appropriate.  In most circumstances, employee education (and continuing acknowledgement) of the employer’s policies, in concert with a method for your business to monitor activity and to “police” itself, can deter most of the individuals who might consider trade secret theft.

If you would like additional information on non-compete agreements and trade secrets law, please contact one of the Burr & Forman Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members.