Is An Assigned Non-Compete Agreement Enforceable?

In the case of a merger or acquisition, the successor company might take an assignment of the current non-compete agreements in favor of the predecessor company.  The enforceability of an assigned non-compete agreement, however, varies from state-to-state, as is true with most issues concerning non-compete law.  Below is a quick survey of how some of the states in the Southeast address the issue:

Georgia – Non-compete agreements, similar to most contracts in the state, are assignable provided that the duties under the agreement do not materially vary from the performance required by the original parties and provided that the contract is not for personal services.  West Coast Cambridge, Inc. v. Rice, 262 Ga. App. 106 (2003) (finding that successor partnership could enforce noncompete agreement against doctor because the law provided no prohibition against the assignment of the agreement and the agreement was expressly binding on successors and assigns, and noting that contract was not for personal services because it only obligated the doctor to not take certain actions).

Tennessee - Tennessee law recognizes that covenants not to compete are assignable absent specific language in the covenants prohibiting assignment.  See Packers Supply Co. v. Weber, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 226 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2008) (citing Bradford & Carson v. Montgomery Furniture Co., 115 Tenn. 610, 92 S.W. 1104 (Tenn. 1906)).

Alabama - Because non-compete agreements are disfavored as a restraint on trade (see Ala. Code § 8-1-1), a successor employer cannot enforce an employee’s covenant not to compete.  Construction Materials v. Kirkpatrick Concrete, 631 So. 2d 1006 (Ala. 1994) (refusing to enforce noncompete agreement for successor of employer and noting that the legislature’s omission of a specific provision in Ala. Code § 8-1-1 establishing a successor employer’s right to enforce an employee’s covenant with the predecessor employer creates an affirmative interference that this code section was not intended to allow enforcement by successor employers).

Florida - In Florida, the question is answered specifically by  Fla. Stat. § 542.335(1)(f)(2), which provides that a “court shall not refuse enforcement of a restrictive covenant on the ground that the person seeking enforcement is . . . an assignee or successor” provided that “the restrictive covenant expressly authorized enforcement by a party’s assignee or successor.”  Recently, Florida’s First District Court of Appeal held that a general assignment clause (such as a statement that the agreement will “inure to the benefit of and be binding upon . . . assigns and successor) is sufficient to assign the agreement to a successor.  DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Waxman, 95 So. 3d 928 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2012).

BURR POINT:  Special attention should be paid when drafting a non-compete covenant to ensure that the assignability of the covenant is in accordance with the parties’ expectations and the applicable state law.

 

If you would like additional information on non-compete agreements and trade secrets law, please contact one of the Burr & Forman Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members.

Does the Alabama Trade Secrets Act Limit Remedies for Theft of Information?

Alabama enacted the Alabama Trade Secrets Act (the “ATSA”) in 1987.  However, since that time, there have been relatively few reported court decisions analyzing the impact of the ATSA on common law claims.  A federal district court in Alabama recently grappled with these issues.  Relying on interpretations of other states’ laws based on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Judge Blackburn read the ATSA’s preemption provision broadly, holding that the ATSA preempted any common law claims based on “the same underlying facts.”  Madison Oslin, Inc. v. Interstate Resources, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142082 (N.D. Ala., Sept. 30, 2012).

In Madison Oslin, the plaintiff was an Alabama-based paper-coating company who had developed a novel process for using polyester instead of wax to coat corrugated cardboard.  Whereas traditional wax-coated cardboard cannot be recycled, the new polyester-coated cardboard would be fully recyclable, saving landfill costs.

This Alabama paper-coating company was approached by a cardboard-box manufacturer with facilities in Maryland, and the two companies proposed forming a joint venture to manufacture polyester-coated corrugated cardboard boxes.  Under the proposed joint venture agreement, the box manufacturer would pay the paper-coating company an initial lump-sum fee of $6 million, and thereafter, the two would evenly split profits from the sale of recyclable boxes through the joint venture.

However, after the cardboard-box manufacturer signed a confidentiality agreement and had been allowed to observe the polyester-coating process during tours of the paper-coating company’s facilities in Alabama, the cardboard-box manufacturer allegedly began advertising (and manufacturing) a “recyclable corrugated box.”  The proposed joint venture agreement apparently remained unsigned, and the box manufacturer did not compensate the paper-coating company for use of its proprietary processes.  The paper-coating company, as plaintiff, then brought a multiple-count complaint against several defendants, including the cardboard-box manufacturer and its subsidiary in Maryland that operated the box-manufacturing facility.   The counts included a cause of action under the ATSA, as well as common law claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and suppression, among others.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s common law claims, arguing that these claims were subsumed by the ATSA claim, and also moved to have the action transferred to Maryland.  In evaluating the motion to dismiss, Judge Blackburn noted that there was very little Alabama case law on point.  Thus, the court analyzed the comments to the ATSA and to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and also examined other courts’ analyses of this issue under trade secrets statutes enacted in Georgia.  As noted in one of the Georgia cases, statutes protecting trade secrets are intended to encourage the free flow of information.  Under this analysis, claims involving “theft of information” should be limited to cases in which the information can be shown to be a trade secret; allowing claims for the theft of “non-proprietary” information or for the theft of “unguarded” proprietary information could arguably discourage this free flow of information.  Finding this reasoning persuasive, Judge Blackburn in Madison Oslin determined that the ATSA preempted any common law causes of action arising from the same factual allegations as ATSA claims and thus dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, breach of fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, and suppression.  The plaintiff was, however, allowed to proceed with its breach-of-contract claims, as well as its ATSA claims.  Because Judge Blackburn also granted the defendants’ request for a transfer, these remaining claims are now being litigated in Maryland.

A “take away” from the Madison Oslin decision is that an Alabama employer faced with the theft of information may want to begin its analysis of potential legal remedies by looking at the ATSA.

If you would like additional information on non-compete agreements and trade secrets law, please contact one of the Burr & Forman Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members.

Alabama Supreme Court Reverses Overly-Broad Injunction Prohibiting Competition Among Defense Contractors

Earlier this year, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed a preliminary injunction entered by the trial court in a case involving competing defense contractors at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville. See Monte Sano Research Corp. v. Kratos Defense & Securities Solutions, Inc., — So. 3d —, 2012 WL 1890693 (Ala. May 25, 2012).  The underlying litigation remains on-going, but the Alabama Supreme Court’s ruling can provide insight for those involved in non-compete litigation in Alabama courts or in non-compete disputes involving government contracts.

By way of background to Monte Sano, the U.S. government awards certain defense contracts (in this case, “Army Aviation and Missile Command Express” contracts) via multi-year “blanket purchase agreements” awarded to “prime contractors” in four different “domains”:  (i) logistics, (ii) programmatic, (iii) technical, and (iv) business and analytical.  In 2005, the Army awarded one such blanket purchase agreement in the technical domain to Computer Science Corporation (“CSC”), who thus became a prime contractor for certain work to be performed at the Redstone Arsenal.  One of the plaintiffs in Monte Sano, Kratos Defense & Securities Solutions, Inc. (“Kratos”), via a predecessor corporation, was part of CSC’s team (i.e., a potential sub-contractor) in obtaining this blanket purchase agreement for the technical domain.  However, simply being a member of the team does not guarantee that individual tasks will be awarded to a particular sub-contractor; additional bidding is involved at the task level.

In Monte Sano, two of the defendants, Steven Thornton and Steven Teague, previously worked for Plaintiff Kratos.  Thornton and Teague both left employment with Kratos in 2011 to work for defendant Monte Sano Research Corp. (“MSRC”).  MSRC was formed in 2009 and was allegedly partially owned by Teague (but not Thornton) at the time of its formation.  Prior to the departure of Thornton and Teague, CSC had entered into various sub-contracts with both Kratos and MSRC to perform work for a “task” under its “blanket purchase agreement” for the “technical” domain at the Redstone Arsenal.   Upon the departure of Thornton and Teague, Kratos immediately filed suit against MSRC, Thornton, and Teague, and obtained from the trial court a preliminary injunction prohibiting MSRC, Thornton, and Teague from procuring work from any “prime contractor” at the Redstone Arsenal.

Notably, although Thornton and Teague had previously entered into non-competition agreements with Kratos, these agreements were of limited duration and expired at the end of 2010.  As such, there were no explicit non-competition agreements in force when Thornton and Teague left Kratos’s employment.  There were, however, more generalized provisions in Kratos’s employee handbook regarding the duty to maintain confidential information and not to solicit Kratos’s employees or otherwise encourage employees to leave Kratos’s employment.  The handbook provisions regarding the duty to maintain confidential information had no time limit, and the duty not to encourage other Kratos employees to leave purported to last one-year beyond the end of employment.  Moreover, in Monte Sano, Kratos alleged that Teague had arranged lunches in which Kratos employees were informed of new opportunities with MSRC.  In bringing claims against Thornton and Teague, Kratos alleged that they had (i) breached their duties of loyalty and their fiduciary duties; (ii) tortiously interfered with Kratos’s contractual relations with the “prime contractor” CSC; and (iii) breached their contractual obligations as set out in Kratos’s employee handbook and elsewhere.  Kratos also brought tortious interference claims against MSRC.

The Alabama Supreme Court, however, reversed the preliminary injunction, noting that the injunction was overly broad because it prohibited MSRC from performing work for any prime contractor at the Redstone Arsenal, in any domain, and not just the technical domain implicated by Kratos’s contract with CSC.  (The evidence in this case showed that MSRC had also been negotiating with prime contractors, other than CSC, in other domains.)  The Alabama Supreme Court also noted that the trial court’s injunction order did not comply with Rule 65(d)(2) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure because it did not provide specific reasons for its decision and did not address why Kratos did not have an adequate remedy at law.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Murdock noted that, because the preliminary injunction would have prevented MSRC from performing its sub-contract with CSC, CSC should also have been named as a party to the litigation.

As to “take aways” from the Monte Sano decision, the Alabama Supreme Court’s holding demonstrates the importance of having written non-competition agreements, such that employers faced with departing employees are not forced to rely on more generalized duties of loyalty and more generalized handbook provisions.  Monte Sano also emphasizes the risks of bringing “tortious interference” claims against a competitor who hires away employees when such claims are not supported by non-competition agreements with specific employees.

This said, the fact that the Monte Sano litigation made it as far it did (and is still on-going) shows that employers without explicit non-competition agreements are not without hope.  Had the preliminary injunction in Monte Sano been limited to the technical domain work covered by Kratos’s contracts with CSC, the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision might have been different, even in the absence of a non-competition agreement.  Thus, perhaps the biggest take away from Monte Sano is that it helps to be specific (and not over-reach), whether in drafting a non-competition agreement at the outset of employment or in seeking relief from a court after a competitor has hired away a key employee. For more clarification on the topic of non-compete agreements and clauses, please contact one of the Burr & Forman team members for assistance.

Early Court Opinions Construing Georgia’s New Non-Compete Statute Confirm Need For Employers to Have Employees Execute New Agreements

As previously reported by this commentator and others, Georgia enacted a new non-compete statute (O.C.G.A. §13-8-50 et seq.), effective May 11, 2011, which drastically alters non-compete agreements in Georgia.  Georgia was previously one of the most difficult states in which to enforce a non-compete agreement, but overnight, Georgia law and public policy changed to become more favorable to employers. The most significant deviation from the prior law is that courts are now allowed to judicially modify (“blue-pencil”) non-compete agreements that are deemed to be overbroad. Before this change, Georgia court had no choice but to rule as void any non-compete that did not meet Georgia’s strict drafting requirements.  Thus, under the new statute, any agreement is potentially enforceable to some degree.  The one catch with the statute is that it only applies to non-compete agreements executed on or after the effective date.

While the new statute was favorably received by Georgia employers, it immediately raised at least two questions for attorneys practicing in the non-compete arena: (1) How would judges use their new found blue-pencil powers for agreements they deemed to be overbroad? and (2) Would courts give any deference to Georgia’s new pro non-compete public policy in interpreting and enforcing non-compete agreements that pre-date the effective date of the statute, even though technically it’s not applicable to those agreements? Eight months into life under the new statute, those questions are starting to get answered, as evidenced by two opinions by Judge Story of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Judge Story’s ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction in Pointenorth Insurance Company v. Zander (2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11341) provides the first published opinion wherein a court applied the new statute and used the judicial “blue pencil” to modify and then enforce a no-compete agreement.  In this case, the plaintiff-employer sued a former employee to enforce a customer non-solicitation covenant contained in an employment agreement dated May 11, 2011 (the effective date of Georgia’s new non-compete statute).  Judge Story found the non-solicit provision to be overbroad because it purported to forbid the employee from soliciting “any of the Employer’s clients”, as opposed to just those with whom the customer interacted.  In exercising the powers granted under the new statute, however, the court modified the non-solicit provision to apply only to customers that the former employee “contacted and assisted” while employed with the plaintiff and granted the requested injunction in accordance with the blue-penciled terms of the agreement.

Another ruling by Judge Story, however, highlights the answer (in the negative) to the question of whether the new public policy would have any effect on non-compete agreements pre-dating effective date of the new statute.  In Boone v. Corestaff Support Services, Inc. (2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85454 (N.D.Ga. 2011)), the court reconsidered a previous decision and held that Georgia’s new non-compete statute, and the employer-friendly public policy it embodies, cannot apply in any way in interpreting and enforcing a non-compete executed prior to the statute. For the agreements drafted prior to the statute, the more-strict prior rules apply, regardless of whether the outcome may be vastly different than if the new statue applied.  In so holding, Judge Story followed the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in Bunker Hill Int’l, Ltd. v. Nationsbuilder Ins. Servs, Inc., (309 Ga. App. 503, 710 S.E. 2d. 662 (2011)).  This same conclusion has subsequently been reached by other Federal District Court judges and appellate panels in the state.  See Fantastic Sams Salons Corp. v. Maxie Enterprises, Inc., (2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8106 (N.D.Ga. 2012)); Hix v. Aon Risk Servs. South, Inc., (2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134569 (N.D. Ga. 2011)); Murphree v. Yancey Bros. Co. (311 Ga. App. 744, 716 S.E. 2d. 824 (2011)).

BURR POINTThe early indication is that courts in Georgia are readily willing to use their new statutory power to judicially modify overbroad non-compete agreements, but only for those agreements executed on or after the effective date of the statute (May 11, 2011).  Any older agreements will still be reviewed under the previous statutes with no help from the newly declared pro non-compete public policy.  Accordingly, Georgia employers should consult an attorney to assist them in having employees under non-compete agreements predating May 11, 2011, execute new agreements.

What is a Trade Secret?

Most businesses are familiar with the concept of a trade secret, but few can accurately define the legal meaning of the term.  Those seeking protection will claim that basically all of their business information qualifies as a trade secret, while defendants fighting a claim will argue that the requirements for something to be a trade secret are extremely restrictive. The answer, of course, is somewhere in the middle.  So, what exactly constitutes a trade secret?

The Uniform Trade Secrets Act has been adopted by 46 states (all except New York, Massachusetts, North Carolina and Texas).  Georgia’s version of the Act defines a trade secret as follows:

“Trade secret” means information, without regard to form, including, but not limited to, technical or nontechnical data, a formula, a pattern, a compilation, a program, a device, a method, a technique, a drawing, a process, financial data, financial plans, product plans, or a list of actual or potential customers or suppliers which is not commonly known by or available to the public and which information:

(A) Derives economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and

(B) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

Whether or not a supposed trade secret satisfies the definition of a trade secret often decides the winners and losers in trade secret disputes.  Here are some examples of decisions by state and Federal courts in Georgia regarding the determination of a trade secret:

Items Ruled as Trade Secrets

  • Written, or electronically-stored, customer lists, if not readily available to the public
  • Computer software
  • Packaging idea
  • Logistics system
  • Healthcare provider’s referral log and workbook containing doctor referral statistics

Not a Trade Secret

  • Intangible customer information existing in the mind of the former employee
  • Recollection of cities that franchisor considered to be good location for future franchises (deemed to be similar to intangible customer information, and thus not protectable)
  • Accumulated technical information in employee’s mind
  • A particular bearing in a cleaning system  (since bearing was stamped with the name of a third party, anyone could call the bearing manufacturer to find out the specifications of the bearing)
  • Name for future newspaper planned by publisher
  • Matters generally known in the industry
  • Process of evaluating amount to bid on tax deeds   (the information was available to the public, and the process was not a unique combination affording possessor a competitive advantage)
  • A customer list that does not provide a competitive advantage (even though it was not publicly available)
  • Investor lists

BURR POINT:  The Uniform Trade Secret Act can be a powerful tool for protecting a confidential business and customer information, but claiming a trade secret and meeting the legal definition of same are two different matters.  Businesses of all types would be well-served to have an attorney review their processes, employment agreements and policies to ensure they are set up to take full advantage of the protection that trade secrets laws provide.

 

Welcome to Burr & Forman’s Non-Compete and Trade Secrets Law Blog!

Welcome to Burr & Forman’s Non-Compete and Trade Secret Law Blog!

In an increasingly competitive and mobile workplace, non-compete agreements and trade secret laws have become necessary tools for employers to protect their valuable customer relationships and confidential information and to avoid unfair competition from former employees and competitors. Continual changes in non-compete and trade secrets law, as well as technological advances providing increasing avenues for unfair competition, make it imperative that businesses in all fields stay abreast of the latest developments in this area.

For these reasons, the attorneys of Burr & Forman’s Non-Compete and Trade Secrets Group have launched this blog to help employers, executives and attorneys keep up with news, statutory changes, legal opinions and practical tips involving all areas of unfair competition law:  non-competes, trade secrets, customer non-solicitation, non-recruitment, non-disclosure, confidentiality agreements, tortious interference with business relations, employee piracy, computer theft, breach of fiduciary duties, employee loyalty, and intellectual property rights.

Because the law relating to most of these areas is state-specific, we will focus on developments in Burr & Forman’s Southeastern focus of Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi and Florida. However, we will also cover any particularly impactful or interesting events in other parts of the country relating to unfair competition. If you need help in a state outside of Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Mississippi or Florida, let us know. We’ve aligned our firm with trusted practices across the country and around the world and we will get your questions answered at the right law firm.

We hope that our clients, as well as other employers, executives and their attorneys, will find this blog informative and entertaining and will make it a regular part of their business reading. If you ever have a question about something on the blog or have an unfair competition issue, feel free to contact any of the Burr & Forman’s Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members and we will be happy to assist you.

Thanks for reading!