Although non-compete and trade secret litigators by definition make our living from disputes involving unfair competition, often the most useful part of our practice involves advising clients on how to avoid litigation. John Marsh of Hahn Loeser has compiled an excellent list for employers and their new hires, of things not to do when the employee leaves the old job, titled The Trade Secret Litigator’s 7 Deadly Sins of Departing Employees in Trade Secret and Non-Compete Disputes. This should be required reading for any transitioning employee; if universally followed, it could put trade secret lawyers out of business!
Alabama Supreme Court Reverses Overly-Broad Injunction Prohibiting Competition Among Defense Contractors
August 29, 2012 by Devin C. Dolive
Earlier this year, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed a preliminary injunction entered by the trial court in a case involving competing defense contractors at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville. See Monte Sano Research Corp. v. Kratos Defense & Securities Solutions, Inc., — So. 3d —, 2012 WL 1890693 (Ala. May 25, 2012). The underlying litigation remains on-going, but the Alabama Supreme Court’s ruling can provide insight for those involved in non-compete litigation in Alabama courts or in non-compete disputes involving government contracts.
By way of background to Monte Sano, the U.S. government awards certain defense contracts (in this case, “Army Aviation and Missile Command Express” contracts) via multi-year “blanket purchase agreements” awarded to “prime contractors” in four different “domains”: (i) logistics, (ii) programmatic, (iii) technical, and (iv) business and analytical. In 2005, the Army awarded one such blanket purchase agreement in the technical domain to Computer Science Corporation (“CSC”), who thus became a prime contractor for certain work to be performed at the Redstone Arsenal. One of the plaintiffs in Monte Sano, Kratos Defense & Securities Solutions, Inc. (“Kratos”), via a predecessor corporation, was part of CSC’s team (i.e., a potential sub-contractor) in obtaining this blanket purchase agreement for the technical domain. However, simply being a member of the team does not guarantee that individual tasks will be awarded to a particular sub-contractor; additional bidding is involved at the task level.
In Monte Sano, two of the defendants, Steven Thornton and Steven Teague, previously worked for Plaintiff Kratos. Thornton and Teague both left employment with Kratos in 2011 to work for defendant Monte Sano Research Corp. (“MSRC”). MSRC was formed in 2009 and was allegedly partially owned by Teague (but not Thornton) at the time of its formation. Prior to the departure of Thornton and Teague, CSC had entered into various sub-contracts with both Kratos and MSRC to perform work for a “task” under its “blanket purchase agreement” for the “technical” domain at the Redstone Arsenal. Upon the departure of Thornton and Teague, Kratos immediately filed suit against MSRC, Thornton, and Teague, and obtained from the trial court a preliminary injunction prohibiting MSRC, Thornton, and Teague from procuring work from any “prime contractor” at the Redstone Arsenal.
Notably, although Thornton and Teague had previously entered into non-competition agreements with Kratos, these agreements were of limited duration and expired at the end of 2010. As such, there were no explicit non-competition agreements in force when Thornton and Teague left Kratos’s employment. There were, however, more generalized provisions in Kratos’s employee handbook regarding the duty to maintain confidential information and not to solicit Kratos’s employees or otherwise encourage employees to leave Kratos’s employment. The handbook provisions regarding the duty to maintain confidential information had no time limit, and the duty not to encourage other Kratos employees to leave purported to last one-year beyond the end of employment. Moreover, in Monte Sano, Kratos alleged that Teague had arranged lunches in which Kratos employees were informed of new opportunities with MSRC. In bringing claims against Thornton and Teague, Kratos alleged that they had (i) breached their duties of loyalty and their fiduciary duties; (ii) tortiously interfered with Kratos’s contractual relations with the “prime contractor” CSC; and (iii) breached their contractual obligations as set out in Kratos’s employee handbook and elsewhere. Kratos also brought tortious interference claims against MSRC.
The Alabama Supreme Court, however, reversed the preliminary injunction, noting that the injunction was overly broad because it prohibited MSRC from performing work for any prime contractor at the Redstone Arsenal, in any domain, and not just the technical domain implicated by Kratos’s contract with CSC. (The evidence in this case showed that MSRC had also been negotiating with prime contractors, other than CSC, in other domains.) The Alabama Supreme Court also noted that the trial court’s injunction order did not comply with Rule 65(d)(2) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure because it did not provide specific reasons for its decision and did not address why Kratos did not have an adequate remedy at law. In a concurring opinion, Justice Murdock noted that, because the preliminary injunction would have prevented MSRC from performing its sub-contract with CSC, CSC should also have been named as a party to the litigation.
As to “take aways” from the Monte Sano decision, the Alabama Supreme Court’s holding demonstrates the importance of having written non-competition agreements, such that employers faced with departing employees are not forced to rely on more generalized duties of loyalty and more generalized handbook provisions. Monte Sano also emphasizes the risks of bringing “tortious interference” claims against a competitor who hires away employees when such claims are not supported by non-competition agreements with specific employees.
This said, the fact that the Monte Sano litigation made it as far it did (and is still on-going) shows that employers without explicit non-competition agreements are not without hope. Had the preliminary injunction in Monte Sano been limited to the technical domain work covered by Kratos’s contracts with CSC, the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision might have been different, even in the absence of a non-competition agreement. Thus, perhaps the biggest take away from Monte Sano is that it helps to be specific (and not over-reach), whether in drafting a non-competition agreement at the outset of employment or in seeking relief from a court after a competitor has hired away a key employee. For more clarification on the topic of non-compete agreements and clauses, please contact one of the Burr & Forman team members for assistance.
Former Events Coordinator Challenges Non-Compete Agreement
August 22, 2012 by John Paul Nefflen
A former employee of Event Logistics, Inc. recently filed suit in the Davidson County Chancery Court challenging her employer’s non-compete agreement signed two years after her employment began. In Veit v. Event Logistics, Inc., Davidson County Chancery Court Docket No. 12-945-III, Falon Marie Veit (“Veit”) alleges her employer, Event Logistics, Inc. (“ELI”), asked her to sign a “Non-Competition, Non-Solicitation, and Confidentiality Agreement” (the “Agreement”) on November 28, 2007 after she was promoted to a vice president position. After completing a high profile event for the 2012 Iroquois Steeplechase, Veit resigned her employment with ELI on May 15, 2012.
The Agreement prohibits Veit for a period of two years from (1) engaging in activities competing with ELI within a 50 mile radius of ELI’s office in Nashville; (2) soliciting ELI’s customers with whom Veit had contact while employed by ELI; and (3) soliciting any of ELI’s employees to terminate his/her employment with ELI.
In her Complaint, Veit asks the Court to determine that the Agreement is not enforceable and that she is free to resume her activities as an events coordinator with clients with whom she worked while employed by ELI. Veit argues ELI is not at risk of unfair competition because (1) event planning does not involve technical skills learned through specialized training provided by ELI; and (2) potential consumers of event planning services are not confidential or proprietary to ELI, but are individuals and commercial businesses that may need such services at any time and any location.
Veit also argues there is no adequate consideration supporting the Agreement. Veit alleges she signed the Agreement because she was promised she would become an owner of ELI. She ended her relation with ELI when it became apparent ELI would not give her an ownership interest in the company.
The Court recently denied Veit’s Motion for a temporary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Agreement. The Court found there were significant disputes as to whether ELI invested in Veit’s training, whether Veit had access to confidential and proprietary information, and whether Veit had developed into the “face of the company” with respect to ELI’s customers. However, the Court temporarily modified the Agreement to allow Veit to engage in certain limited event coordinating activities so she could make a living.
This will be an interesting case to watch. Veit’s challenge to ELI’s non-compete agreement goes to the heart of balancing between the desire for free trade and prohibiting a former employee from unfairly competing against her employer. It also demonstrates the Court’s authority to modify or “blue pencil” a non-compete agreement to achieve this balance.
Watch for updates on Veit v. Events Logistics, Inc. in the near future.
The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine — A Glimmer of Hope in the Absence of a Non-Compete Agreement
August 15, 2012 by Chip Collins
In the hilarious movie Dumb and Dumber, the imbecilic and unattractive character played by Jim Carrey is told by the beautiful woman he is pursuing that the chances of them winding up together are about one in a million, to which he excitedly replies, “So you’re telling me there’s a chance!” Similarly, if an employer wants to enjoin a former employee from working for a competitor, but the employee is not under any sort of non-compete agreement with the former employer, has taken no company records and property, and has not revealed any confidential information or trade secrets to the new employer, the inevitable disclosure doctrine of trade secrets law provides the employer with at least a “chance” of getting the desired injunction.
The inevitable disclosure doctrine is used by employers to stop former employees from working for competitors, even in the absence of a non-compete agreement, on the basis that it is inevitable that the employee will use or disclose the former employer’s trade secrets in connection with the new employment. The significance of this theory is that the employer is not required to prove an actual misappropriation of a trade secret, but rather that the disclosure of the trade secret is inevitable based on the nature of the information and the circumstances of the employee’s new position.
As with all trade secret issues, the law on inevitable disclosure varies somewhat from state to state. For instance, California courts have rejected the doctrine as creating a “de facto covenant not to compete”, Bayer Corp. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 1999), and held that the doctrine “cannot be used as a substitute for proving actual or threatened misappropriation of trade secrets.” Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 294 (4th Dist. 2002). The Third Circuit Federal Court of Appeals, however, applied a relatively lenient standard under Pennsylvania law for successfully using the theory, holding that an employer need only show a “substantial likelihood” of disclosure of a trade secret. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 613 F.3d 102,110 (3d Cir. 2010). (For an excellent nationwide survey of the doctrine, see Ryan A. Wiesner, A State-by-State Analysis of Inevitable Disclosure: A Need for Uniformity and a Workable Standard, 16 Intellectual Property L. Rev. 211 (2012)).
The Georgia Supreme Court has recognized the inevitable disclosure doctrine, although not referring to it by name, in the case of Essex Group, Inc. v. Southwire Corp., 269 Ga. 553, 501 S.E. 2d 501 (1998). In that opinion, the court upheld the trial court’s injunction prohibiting Southwire’s former employee from working for Southwire’s direct competitor’s logistics department for a period of five years. As the basis for its ruling, the court concluded that the competitor had “sought to obtain, by the simple act of hiring [Southwire’s former employee], all the logistics information it had taken Southwire millions of dollars and years of testing and modifications to develop as part of Southwire’s plan to acquire a competitive edge over other cable and wire companies ….” Id. at 557. There was neither mention in the opinion of the employee having a non-compete agreement nor any mention of an actual misappropriation by the employee of the alleged trade secret. Instead, the implication of the decision was that disclosure of Southwire’s logistics system was inevitable because of the identity of Southwire and its competitor’s business.
BURR POINT: Even in the absence of an enforceable non-compete agreement, the inevitable disclosure doctrine provides a means for enjoining a former employee’s competitive activities in certain circumstances. For more information on the inevitable disclosure doctrine or how it might apply to your business, don’t hesitate to contact one of the Burr & Forman team members.
The Court’s Broad Power To Enjoin Trade Secret Violations Can Be Costly
July 18, 2012 by John Paul Nefflen
On June 27, 2012, we reported that TNA Entertainment, LLC (“TNA”), a local professional wrestling promotion company, sued its former employee, Brian Wittenstein, and a direct competitor, World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. (“WWE”), for unlawfully using TNA’s trade secrets to unfairly compete against TNA. (TNA Entertainment, LLC v. Wittenstein and World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., Davidson County Chancery Court, Docket No. 12-746-III.) The alleged trade secrets included information about TNA’s contracts with wrestling talent. TNA alleged that WWE used TNA’s trade secrets to solicit wrestling talent already under contract with TNA.
In addition to the damages it claims to have suffered, TNA also requested that the Court enter a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to prohibit WWE and Wittenstein from continuing to use TNA’s trade secrets. Under Tennessee law, a Court may restrain an offending party from engaging in certain conduct when the injured party shows it will suffer immediate and irreparable harm. TROs generally last for a short period of time, but may be extended if there is good cause to do so. The Court may also issue a temporary injunction which can last during the life of the lawsuit.
On May 24, 2012, the Court in TNA Entertainment issued a comprehensive, far reaching TRO which could have had adverse effects on WWE’s business. The restraining order prohibited WWE and Wittenstein from doing the following:
- Breaching or attempting to breach Wittenstein’s Separation Agreement with TNA, including disclosing, transmitting, or otherwise using TNA’s confidential, trade secret, and proprietary information;
- Retaining and failing to return TNA’s confidential, trade secret, and proprietary information or property in any form;
- Destroying, deleting, erasing, modifying, or otherwise failing to preserve TNA’s confidential, trade secret, and proprietary information;
- Soliciting or contracting wrestling talent identified in TNA’s confidential information or taken by Wittenstein; and
- Interfering with TNA’s contracts and prospective business relationships which WWE learned through TNA’s confidential, trade secret, and proprietary information.
In addition, the Court specifically required WWE and Wittenstein to not destroy or alter and to provide access information to any computers or similar devices which WWE and Wittenstein used in storing, transmitting, or receiving TNA’s confidential information and trade secrets. The purpose of this requirement is to allow TNA to inspect WWE and Wittenstein’s computers for use of TNA’s confidential information and trade secrets.
As a condition to entering the Restraining Order, TNA was required to post a $30,000 bond.
The May 24, 2012 TRO was later dissolved as to WWE. After a hearing, the Court determined that WWE posed no threat of immediate or irreparable harm to TNA and had already returned TNA’s property. WWE also committed to not solicit TNA’s wrestling talent and to preserve its computers and other devices for inspection at a later date.
While the TRO seems to have had little effect on WWE, because WWE had already taken corrective action with respect to TNA’s confidential information and trade secrets, in other cases such a comprehensive TRO and/or temporary injunction could prove to be costly. A new employer could suffer loss of business, damages for interfering with a competitor’s contracts, significant costs for litigation, and loss of reputation. As we said earlier, employers should always be aware of and protect themselves against potential liability when hiring an employee who may possess a former employer’s confidential trade secrets. If you have any questions for your business on trade secrets or liabilities when hiring an employee, don’t hesitate to contact one of the Burr & Forman Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members.
Preparing for a Smack Down: Local Wrestling Company Sues Former Employee and World Wrestling Entertainment for Trade Secrets Violation
June 27, 2012 by John Paul Nefflen
A local professional wrestling promotions company, TNA Entertainment, LLC (“TNA”), has sued former employee, Brian Wittenstein, and direct competitor, World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. (“WWE”), for unlawfully using TNA’s trade secrets against them in unfair competition. The case, entitled TNA Entertainment, LLC v. Wittenstein and World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc., was filed on May 23, 2012 in the Davidson County Chancery Court, Docket No. 12-746-III and alleges that Wittenstein and WWE violated Tennessee’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act.
According to TNA, Wittenstein was terminated from the company on August 3, 2011. In connection with his separation, Wittenstein entered into a Separation Agreement and General Release (the “Agreement”), which expressly prohibited him from disclosing TNA’s confidential trade secrets, including information about TNA’s contracts with other wrestling talent.
TNA claims that Wittenstein violated the agreement by downloading TNA’s company policies, contractual agreements with other wrestling talent, and detailed information about its wrestling talent (including compensation). TNA then claims that Wittenstein disclosed the gathered information to his new employer, and direct competitor of TNA, WWE. TNA asserts that WWE’s possession and use of TNA’s confidential trade secrets provide WWE an unfair competitive advantage regarding wrestling talent.
TNA alleges that WWE has used TNA’s confidential trade secrets to solicit wrestling talent currently, under contract with TNA, and encourage them to join WWE. Wrestler Ric Flair is a recent example of a client that TNA claims attempted to terminate his exclusive contract with them to sign up with WWE.
To date, the court has entered a temporary restraining order, prohibiting WWE from using TNA’s confidential information. Though this case is relatively new, it is a prime example of how costly unlawful use of trade secrets can be to former employees and new employers. Under the Tennessee Uniform Trade Secrets Act, the unlawful user of trade secrets can be liable for the plaintiff’s actual loss caused by the misappropriation of trade secrets and any “unjust enrichment.” In certain cases, the defendant may also be liable for “exemplary damages” resulting in up to twice the award for the plaintiff’s damages and the plaintiff’s attorney fees.
Ultimately, employers should always be aware of and protect themselves against potential liability when hiring an employee who may possess a former employer’s confidential trade secrets. If you need more information on confidential trade secrets and defenses against former employees, please contact any of the Burr & Forman Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members for assistance.
“Full Time and Attention” Provisions Provide an Additional Weapon in Non-Compete Cases
June 20, 2012 by Chip Collins
An employer seeking to stop or slow down a former employee who is unfairly competing with business needs to examine every possible legal claim as options to use against the employee. In many cases, the employee spent time laying the groundwork for new employment or business ventures while still employed by the previous employer. These situations present another legal opportunity to employers, in addition to the usual considerations of non-compete, non-solicitation and trade secret violation claims. The employer and its attorney should consider a claim against the former employee based on a common provision in employment contracts: the requirement that the employee devote his “full time and attention” (or similar language) to the employment.
There’s not a lot of case law interpreting these provisions, but the cases that do show that this boilerplate language can potentially provide another arrow in the employer’s quiver. In example:
- A doctor who spent time managing his rental property business instead of seeing patients during office hours was potentially liable to his employer for failing to devote his “full, entire and undivided professional time and attention” to his employer. See Bhandari v. Southwest Community Health Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37750 (D.N.M. 2011).
- A casino-building company was allowed to maintain a suit against its CEO for breach of fiduciary duty based upon a “full time and attention” clause where the CEO was allegedly doing consulting work on the side for a company that built water processing systems, collecting over $600,000 for such work. See Endacott v. Int’l Hospitality, Inc., 910 So. 2d 915 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2005).
- A CFO who concocted a plan to take over his employer using insider knowledge was held to have breached his contractual obligation to “devote his full business time and attention and best efforts” to his duties for the employer. See Lydall, Inc. v. Ruschmeyer, 282 Conn. 209 (Conn. 2007)
BURR POINT: While non-compete claims focus on what an employee did after they left their employment, the employee’s activities prior to their departure could lead to a claim for breaching a contractual duty to devote their “full time and attention” to the former employer’s business.
The Implied Negative Covenant: Can a Fixed-Term Employment Contract Substitute for a Non-Compete Agreement?
June 13, 2012 by Devin C. Dolive
Fans of professional football may recall the predicament faced by former Cincinnati Bengals quarterback Carson Palmer at the beginning of the 2011 season. Prior to the season, Palmer had announced that he no longer wished to play for the Bengals. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Bengals took him at his word, and Palmer did not play for the Bengals in 2011. However, what seemed to be more surprising is that the Bengals did not rush to trade Palmer to another team. Rather, for the first half of the 2011 season, Palmer played for no team — as reported by the Cincinnati Enquirer on July 27, 2011, Bengals president Mike Brown explained: “Carson signed a contract, he made a commitment. He gave us his word and we relied on his word and his commitment. . . . If he is going to walk away from his commitment, we aren’t going to reward him for doing it.” It was not until October of 2011 that the Bengals finally released Palmer from his contract and traded him to the Oakland Raiders.
An analysis of Carson Palmer’s predicament has implications beyond the world of professional football. Although few employers have employment contracts as detailed as those used in professional sports, other employers may view a key employee’s departure the same way that Bengals president, Mike Brown, viewed Carson Palmer’s announcement. Employers may ask the following question: When a key employee leaves without notice, and there is no formal “non-compete agreement” in writing, is the employer completely without hope in preventing the departing employee from working for someone else? Before answering this question, it is important to look at all agreements between the employer and the departing employee, and not just specific “non-compete agreements.” One agreement that could impact such a scenario is a fixed-term employment contract.
The default rule in employment law in the United States is “employment at will.” Under the common law as applied in most states, the default rule is that the employment relationship is “at will” and that either the employer or the employee can terminate the employment relationship at any time and for any reason (or for no reason at all). Of course, a number of state and federal statutes and court decisions have created exceptions to this “default rule,” exceptions that limit an employer’s ability to act. For example, although an employer can terminate an employee’s employment “for any reason,” the employer cannot terminate employment based on reasons that have been declared illegal by statute (e.g., under the federal Title VII statute, an employer may not terminate employment because of an employee’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). Similarly, although an employer can terminate an employee’s employment “at any time,” statutes may require some notice before certain terminations (e.g., the federal WARN Act requires 60 days’ notice before employees can be terminated as a consequence of a “plant closing” or “mass layoff,” as defined in the statute).
Perhaps the biggest exception to “employment at will” is when the parties of an employment relationship choose to contract for something else. For example, in the collective bargaining context, most unions will bargain for provisions in the collective bargaining agreement requiring “just cause” for any terminations, and collective bargaining agreements may go into great specificity about what constitutes “just cause” and provide that disputes over terminations be resolved through grievance procedures, including arbitration. Similarly, highly sought-after and specialized individual employees (e.g., executives, scientific researchers, physicians, entertainment personalities, and, yes, professional athletes) may have sufficient “clout” to insist on a written employment contract from their employer, so as to guarantee employment (and income) for a fixed term and require specific notice before the contract (and thus the employment relationship) can be terminated.
What may be less appreciated, however, is that such individually-negotiated “fixed-term” employment contracts can be a “two-way street.” Depending on how it is written, a contract providing for a two-year term of employment (subject, perhaps, to “automatic” renewal provisions) and requiring four months’ notice before the contract can be terminated might be capable of being applied to both to the employer and the employee. A provision requiring four months’ notice of any termination of the contract may provide protection not just to the employee (i.e., the four months’ notice provision ensures that the employee will have four months to look for other employment before her paychecks stop coming) but also to the employer (i.e., the employer will have four months to find a replacement if the employee chooses to leave).
The trickier question is what the remedy should be when an employee leaves employment without providing the notice required under a fixed-term employment contract. Courts will not grant “specific performance” of an employment contract, insofar as there can be no “involuntary servitude” (i.e., an employee cannot be compelled to work against their will). However, some courts have entertained the possibility of “negative specific performance.” Although the court cannot compel an employee to work for “Employer A” against their will, the court may be able to enjoin (prohibit) the employee from working for any other employer during the specific time period that the employee had committed to work only for “Employer A.” In cases involving entertainment personalities and professional athletes, for instance, courts have considered granting such “negative specific performance” where the employer shows that (i) there is a fixed-term employment contract, (ii) the employee left employment before the term was up, and (iii) the employee’s services are unique or extraordinary. Courts have called this the “equivalent of a covenant not to compete.”
For employers, does this mean that fixed-term employment contracts are a perfect substitute for covenants not to compete? Probably not; it should be kept in mind that courts prefer to award money damages and are often not inclined to issue injunctions depriving a departing employee of their ability to earn a living unless it is clear that this is what the parties bargained for. Thus, employers who want to make sure that key employees cannot leave and work for competitors are better off specifying this when they negotiate contracts with the individual employees. On the other hand, both employers and employees should keep in mind that a fixed-term employment contract can “cut both ways” and can be used to provide protections not just to the employee but to the employer as well.
If you are an employer and want more information on or wish to discuss non-compete agreements or fixed-term employment contracts, please contact any of the Burr & Forman’s Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members and we will be happy to assist you.
Valid Non-Compete Agreement Declared Ineffective: Hard Lessons from Soft Language
June 6, 2012 by Peter C. Vilmos
Even a valid non-compete agreement can fail to provide the scope of protection that the drafter expects. In March 2012, Florida’s Fifth Circuit of Appeal decided Heiderich v. Florida Equine Veterinary Services, Inc., 37 Fla. L. Weekly D759a, giving little effect to a valid non-compete agreement. The language in the non-compete agreement only prevented the employee from establishing an office located within a specified geographic area and did not prohibit the employee from conducting business within the geographical bounds. In Heiderich, the employee signed a valid non-compete agreement and was reminded of such upon termination. Within the period of non-compete, the employee established an office just outside the geographic radius, and then delivered services within the non-compete geographical boundaries.
In reversing the lower court’s temporary injunction, the appellate court found that the language in the non-compete only meant that the employee could not establish a physical business location within the 30 mile radius.
“[E]mployee shall not own, manage, operate, control, be employed by, assist, participate in, or have any material interest in any business or profession engaged in general equine veterinary practice located within a thirty (30) mile radius of [FEVS’s business address]”
The court found that there was nothing in the non-compete agreement to stop the employee from establishing an office 31 miles from the company and then servicing the clients within 30 miles of the company, ruling that “the non-compete agreement does not prohibit [the employee] from providing . . . services within a 30-mile radius of [the company], so long as her business office is outside that radius.”
The clause only prohibits the employee from “owning or being employed by a business or profession engaged in equine veterinary practice located within a 30-mile radius of FEVs. It does not . . . prohibit [the employee] from practicing equine veterinary medicine anywhere within the 30-mile radius.”
Heiderich is consistent with previous Florida decisions on the issue. In Tam-Bay Realty, Inc. v. Ross, 534 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), a non-compete agreement stated that the sellers of a real-estate brokerage firm were not to compete with the business in any of the following ways:
“by opening, operating, serving as an officer, director or other employee of any real estate brokerage business located with the geographical boundaries of Pinellas County, Florida…”
However, according to a Florida court the non-compete agreement did not prohibit the seller from advertising in the phone book, obtaining a local phone number, running advertisements for homes, or listing themselves in business directories within the area the non-compete purported to protect.
The court found that the sellers “did not breach the covenant because they had not competed by ‘opening, operating, serving as an officer or director of any brokerage business located within Pinellas County.’ Rather, the sellers had competed within Pinellas County ‘from a brokerage business located outside of Pinellas County thereby adhering to the literal meaning of the non-compete agreement.”
How does this affect your business? There is the potential that your valid, negotiated non-compete agreement might leave you exposed to unexpected future competition. In light of the March 2012 decision in Heiderich, it is more important than ever to re-examine existing non-compete agreements to ensure that they offer meaningful protection and do not just make competing less convenient.
Contact Burr & Forman today to ensure that your business is secure. Burr & Forman’s Non-Compete & Trade Secrets team members would be happy to review your company’s non-compete agreement or answer any further questions you have about protecting your businesses from unfair competition.
Specific Limitation on Soliciting Class of Persons May Substitute for Territorial Limitation
May 9, 2012 by John Paul Nefflen
Though disfavored in Tennessee, non-compete agreements can be enforced if an employer has a legitimate business interest to be protected and the time and geographical limitations are reasonable.
Non-compete agreements are not analyzed in the abstract, but in the context of the specific circumstances under which they are to be enforced. The question is whether the employer has a legitimate business interest to be protected by the non-compete agreement. Tennessee courts hold that there is no “legitimate interest in protection from competition, only from unfair competition.” An employer must show special circumstances over and above ordinary competition creating an unfair advantage for the former employee without the non-compete agreement.
Hence, only if a court first finds the non-compete agreement protects the employer from unfair competition by a former employee, will it determine whether the non-compete agreement is reasonable. The time and geographic limitations of the non-compete agreement must not be greater than necessary to protect the employer’s interest against unfair competition.
A non-compete agreement may lack a geographic limit which, in some cases, is fatal to the agreement.
However, Tennessee courts have held a requirement prohibiting former employees from soliciting the employer’s customers and this can substitute for a geographic limitation.
In the most recent case examining this issue, the non-compete agreement lacked a geographic limitation, but prohibited the former employee from soliciting the same type of business for one year from any of the employer’s current customers, customers with whom the employee did business on behalf of the employer, and prospective customers with respect to whom the employee acquired confidential information from the employer. The employee argued that the agreement’s lack of any geographic limitation rendered it unenforceable.
The court held because the non-compete agreement prohibited the former employee from soliciting the same business from the employer’s customers, the agreement was enforceable even without a geographic limitation. The court reasoned that as the specificity of the class of persons with whom contact is prohibited increases, the need for a geographic limitation decreases. Additionally, the restriction on who the former employee may contact, rather than where the former employee may work, gives the former employee greater freedom to practice her profession in the same area as her former employer.
A non-compete agreement which omits a geographic limitation, but prohibits soliciting the same business from the employer’s customers, satisfies the threshold requirement of protecting the employer’s legitimate interest against unfair competition without imposing an undue restraint on trade. The risk, however, of not having a geographic limitation is that the former employee may directly compete for the employer’s potential customers which fall outside of the parameters of the agreement.
In some instances, the former employee could use specialized training received from the employer to compete for those potential customers. Therefore, careful consideration should be given when substituting a restriction against solicitation for a geographic limitation.
For more information on non-compete agreements and their state requirements contact Burr Forman for more insights on the enforceability of non-compete clauses.